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INTRODUCTION 
In 1985 the United States Supreme Court determined in Tennessee v. Gar-
ner 1 that a state statute, authorizing the use of deadly force to capture a fleeing 
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felon, violated the fourth amendment2 to the United States Constitution. 3 Since 
this decision, plaintiffs have begun to make a new constitutional argument in 
their claims that state police actions violated their rights under section 1983 of 
the Civil Rights Act. 4 Instead of solely alleging a violation of substantive due 
process under the fourteenth amendment, 5 which prohibits egregious conduct, 6 
2. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id The fourth amendment is applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55, 660 (1961) (evidence is inadmissible in state criminal trial that is ob-
tained by searches and seizures in violation of fourth amendment as applied to states by fourteenth 
amendment) (overruling in part Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (fourteenth amendment 
does not bar use in state criminal trial of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure even 
though such search and seizure by state would be counter to fourteenth amendment due process)); 
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. 
3. Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11-12. Some commentators, however, have criticized the Supreme 
Court's analysis under the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Aleinikoff', Constitutional Law in the Age of 
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 990-91 (1987). Professor Aleinikoff'has stated that the decision "does 
not seem to be about the Fourth Amendment." I d. (emphasis in original). He contends that the 
Court failed to construct a theory for analyzing the cases under the fourth amendment. /d. Another 
commentator has argued that the Court's holding would have been more cogently based on the 
fourteenth amendment, not the fourth amendment. See Comment, Law Officer's Use of Deadly 
Force Against Nondangerous Fleeing Felons Held Violative of the Fourth Amendment-Tennessee v. 
Garner, 17 SETON HALL 758, 780-81 (1987). The Court's analysis in Gamer, however, is consistent 
with prior opinions discussing the fourth amendment in that it affirms the Court's commitment to 
balancing interests. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.l2 (1981) (balancing is 
"key principle" of fourth amendment). 
4. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which states that "[e]very person who, 
under color of ... [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivation of 
any right ... secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." Section 
1983 addresses statutory and unconstitutional violations by individuals acting under color of state 
law; a Bivens action addressees unconstitutional violations by officials acting under color of federal 
law. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397' 
(1971) (individual injured by Federal agents in violation fourth amendment rights entitled to 
redress). 
5. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment prohibits state officials from de-
priving a person "of life [or] liberty ... without due process of law." Id The fifth amendment to the 
United States Constitution similarly prohibits federal officials. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. 
6. See infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the type of conduct that 
violates the fourteenth amendment. Before the Gamer decision, plaintiff's generally alleged that 
force used during their arrests violated their right to substantive due process under the fourteenth 
amendment, which prohibits conduct that shocks the conscience. See, e.g., Fiacco v. City of Rensse-
laer, 783 F.2d 319, 321-26 (2d Cir. 1986) (police officers violated plaintiff's rights under fifth and 
fourteenth amendments by using excessive force when arresting plaintifl), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 
1384 (1987); cf Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a Constitutional Right to Personal Security 
under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State Officials in Violation of the Fourth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 ALB. L. REv. 171, 200 (1987) (prior to Gamer, few courts sought 
to determine if force used during arrest violated fourth amendment). Courts considering these sub-
stantive due process claims did not consider whether police officers properly could assert the defense 
of "good faith" or qualified immunity, because conduct that "shocks the conscience" was plainly 
without justification. 
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these plaintiffs have alleged that force used by state police officers during their 
arrests violated the fourth amendment, which prohibits "unreasonable" 
seizures.' Courts considering fourth amendment claims, however, have dis-
agreed as to whether police officers who use unreasonable force properly may 
assert qualified immunity, 8 an affirmative defense currently defined by the 
7. See, e.g., Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1987) (proper standard in 
analyzing excessive force is fourth amendment); Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 7-8 (2d Cir. 
1987) (plaintiff's claim rested on fourth amendment), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 701 (1988); Gilmere v. 
City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1507-10 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (claims asserted included fourth 
amendment violation), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); see also supra notes 1-3 and accompanying 
text for a discussing stating that the fourth amendment is applicable when officers "seize" a person 
within the meaning of the amendment. 
Officers seize an individual " 'only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' " Michigan v. Ches-
temut, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979 (1988) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 
(1980)). In Chesternut, a majority of the Court rejected the bright-line rule that a seizure occurs 
only if a person is actually apprehended. /d. Officers thus may seize individuals by physically re-
straining them or by threatening to use force. See, e.g., Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (police officers seized plaintiffs by conducting ten-hour unlawful siege of house using 
helicopters and missiles). But see Brower v. County of lnyo, 817 F.2d 540, 546-48 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(person who was fleeing from police officers and crashed into roadblock was not seized), cert. 
granted, 108 S. Ct. 2869 (1988); Cameron v. City of Pontiac, Mich., 813 F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir. 
1987) (shooting at decedent did not constitute seizure because bullets never hit him as he fatally ran 
onto highway in attempt to ftee from police officers). 
8. Some courts have stated that qualified immunity is not a defense to a fourth amendment 
claim alleging the unlawful use of force during an arrest because the law is clearly established that 
the use of excessive force is unlawful. See, e.g., Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1988); 
Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1217 (1st Cir. 1986); Vizbaras v. Prieber, 761 F.2d 1013, 
1018-19 (4th Cir. 1985) (Winter J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986); 
Oark v. Beville, 730 F.2d 739, 740 (11th Cir. 1984); Stanulonis v. Marzec, 649 F. Supp. 1536, 1545 
(D. Conn. 1986); Skevofilax v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 545 (D.N.J. 1984). See generally Patzner 
v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1370 (8th Cir. 1985) (qualified immunity raised as to warrantless arrest 
claim, but not as to excessive force claim). 
Other courts, however, have stated that qualified immunity is a defense to fourth amendment 
claims alleging unnecessary force during an arrest because a police officer may reasonably, but mis-
takenly, believe that such force was necessary. See, e.g., Whitt v. Smith, 832 F.2d 451, 452-54 (7th 
Cir. 1987); White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986); Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d 
1543, 1548-50 (11th Cir. 1985); Varela v. Jones, 746 F.2d 1413, 1418 (lOth Cir. 1984); Bauer v. 
Norris, 713 F.2d 408, 411 (8th Cir. 1983); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972); Bibbo v. Mulhern, 621 F. Supp. 1018, 1027 (D. Mass. 
1985). Some courts have stated that qualified immunity is a defense to a fourth amendment exces-
sive force claim when a police officer reasonably relies on a statute or a judicial decision that autho-
rizes the use of force. See, e.g., Washington v. Starke, 855 F.2d 346, 348 (6th Cir. 1988); Klein v. 
Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 371-75 (7th Cir. 1988); Garner v. Memphis Police Department, 710 F.2d 240, 
242 (6th Cir. 1983), affd Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 
1327 n.l4 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978); see generally Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 13 n.l3, Graham v. Connor, cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1988) 
(No. 87-6571) ("An officer is most likely entitled to qualified immunity in a case ... where he uses 
force that is allowed under a state law that is only later determined to be unconstitutional."). But see 
generally Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-55 (1987) (exclusionary rule applicable when a reason-
able officer would have known that statute was unconstitutional). 
Other courts have stated that qualified immunity may be a defense. See. e.g., Heath v. Henning, 
854 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1988); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 n.7 (4th Cir. 1988); Fiacco v. City 
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Supreme Court as affording immunity when the challenged conduct was "objec-
tively reasonable."9 Recent decisions by the Supreme Court interpreting both 
qualified immunity10 and the fourth amendment11 complicate resolution of this 
issue. 12 
Even though section 1983 states that "[e]very person, who under color of 
[state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivation 
of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liab/e," 13 the 
· Supreme Court nevertheless has determined that under some circumstances po-
of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987); Vizbaras v. 
Prieber, 761 F.2d 1013, 1016 (4th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986); Coon v. Ledbetter, 
780 F.2d 1158, 1164 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986) (question left open issue whether qualified immunity is 
defense to constitutional claims based on negligence). 
The disagreement among the circuits was recently mirrored in a qualified immunity decision by 
the Sixth Circuit in Holt v. Artis, 843 F.2d 242, 246-47 (6th Cir. 1988). In Holt, the court consid-
ered a claim that officers used unreasonable force during an arrest in violation of the fourteenth 
amendment. /d. at 244. The majority of the court stated that not only is it clearly established that 
officers may not use unlawful force during an arrest, but also that officers do not act reasonably when 
they use more force than is necessary. /d. at 246. The dissent agreed that the law clearly prohibits 
unnecessary force, but disagreed that officers who use unnecessary force are deemed to have acted 
unreasonably. /d. at 247 (Wellford, J., dissenting). 
9. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). See infra notes 42-143 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the qualified immunity standard. Officials performing prosecutorial, judi-
cial, or legislative functions may properly assert absolute immunity as a defense in section 1983 
actions. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 
547 (1967) (judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators). When performing these 
functions, officials are immune from an award of damages, regardless of their motives for acting. 
In determining whether officials may properly assert absolute or qualified immunity, the 
Supreme Court has traditionally focused on the functions performed by the officials, not the status of 
the officials. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538, 542, 545 (1988). In Forrester, the Supreme 
Court determined that although judges have absolute immunity for their judicial acts, they might be 
able to assert qualified immunity for their employment decisions because such decisions are not 
·~udicial acts." /d. at 545. Similarly, the kind of immunity available to police officers depends on 
the function they were performing. See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345 (1983) (police 
officer has absolute immunity for testimony at criminal trial); White v. Frank, 680 F. Supp. 629, 638 
(S.D.N.Y.) (police officer has qualified immunity for statements made to grand jury), appeal dis-
missed, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988). The Court has generally been reluctant to recognize absolute 
immunity. See, e.g., Forrester, 108 S. Ct. at 542 (use of "qualified immunity" prevents unnecessary 
broadening of traditional absolute immunity concept). 
10. See, e.g, Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040 (1987) (qualified immunity for war-
rantless search); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1986) (qualified immunity for invalid arrest 
warrant). See infra notes 138-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases. 
11. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. I, II (1985) (under some circumstances deadly 
force may be used to seize a fleeing felon); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (evidence 
illegally seized may be used in a criminal proceeding if the seizure was objectively reasonable). See 
infra notes 166-74, 240-53, 262-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases. 
12. This article examines the availability of qualified immunity for the unlawful use of force by 
state officials in section 1983 actions. Resolution of this issue, however, also resolves the issue of 
availability of qualified immunity for federal officials in Bivens actions because the Supreme Court 
has stated that the qualified immunity standard for constitutional violations is the same for both 
state and federal officials. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (court refused to 
distinguish between suits against state officials and federal officials with regard to immunity). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (emphasis added). 
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lice officers have qualified immunity from suits seeking monetary damages under 
section 1983 for their unlawful searches and seizures.l4 Since its first decision 
on immunity in 1951, 15 the Court frequently has redefined the standard. 16 
In 1982 the Supreme Court, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 17 articulated the cur-
rent standard for qualified immunity after noting that its prior standards had 
failed to adequately protect officials. 18 It held that "government officials per-
forming discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 19 In 
promulgating this standard, the Court eliminated from consideration whether 
officials had acted in subjective bad faith, an element that previously had made 
qualified immunity unavailable as a defense. 20 The Court stated that "objective 
reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly estab-
lished law,"21 would better balance the interests of aggrieved citizens against the 
interests of state officials and society.22 To determine whether police officers 
have qualified immunity thus requires an understanding of what the Court 
means by "objective reasonableness" and "clearly established law" in the con-
text of the fourth amendment. 
In two recent decisions, Malley v. Briggs 23 and Anderson v. Creighton,24 the 
Supreme Court determined that even if police officers acted unreasonably by 
arresting a person pursuant to an invalid warrant or by conducting a warrantless 
14. See infra notes 144-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's 
qualified immunity decisions. Qualified immunity is a defense only to an award of damages; it does 
not bar plaintiffs from seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See, e.g., Prisco v. United States, 85 I 
F.2d 93, 95 (3d Cir. 1988) (defense of qualified immunity unavailable to actions for prospective 
relief). 
15. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). The Supreme Court first set forth a two-part 
test to determine whether officials may properly assert absolute immunity as a defense. Id. at 375-
79. The Court considered whether the official had immunity at common law and whether Congress 
in enacting section 1983 intended to abrogate common law immunity. Id. at 376-79. For a discus-
sion of how the Supreme Court has inconsistently applied this two-part test, see Matasar, Personal 
Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REv. 741, 
745-94 (1987). 
16. See infra notes 42-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's redefining of 
the standards. 
17. 457 u.s. 800 (1982). 
18. /d. at 815-19. 
19. /d. at 818. It also created an "extraordinary circumstances" exception to the general rule: 
if officials could prove that they neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, 
they would nonetheless have immunity. /d. at 819. 
20. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's elimination of 
the subjective bad faith standard. 
21. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (quoting 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). 
22. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the Court's balancing of interests. 
23. 475 U.S. 335 (1986). See infra notes 154-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Malley decision. 
24. 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987). See infra notes 178-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the Anderson decision. 
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search, in violation of the fourth amendment, they nevertheless could assert 
qualified immunity as a defense if their conduct was "objectively reasonable. "25 
These decisions indicate that the Court has two definitions of the word "reason-
able." One definition relates to the fourth amendment's requirement that con-
duct be "reasonable;"26 the other definition relates to section 1983's 
requirement, as interpreted by the Court, that conduct be "objectively reason-
able" for police officers to have qualified immunity.27 Because the Court has 
determined that there are two standards of reasonableness, conduct may be "un-
reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment but nevertheless "ob-
jectively reasonable" for the purpose of qualified immunity.28 
The purpose of this article is to focus attention on another fourth amend-
ment claim recently asserted by plaintiffs: the use of excessive force by police 
officers during an arrest. Section I discusses the evolution of the qualified immu-
nity defense and concludes that the Court in Harlow attempted to articulate an 
objective standard that would require courts to consider only a legal question-
whether the challenged conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or 
statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known. 29 The Harlow 
Court asserted that this standard would allow dismissal of insubstantial claims 
prior to discovery, in contrast to the previous standard that compelled courts to 
consider the factual issue of an officer's subjective good faith. 30 Section II exam-
ines the Court's application of the Harlow standard to claims asserting a viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. 31 The Court has dramatically modified the 
Harlow reasonableness standard by returning to the fact-specific reasonableness 
standard of Procunier v. Navarette, 32 a pre-Harlow decision. 33 The modified 
25. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3038-42 (invalid warrant); Malley, 475 U.S. at 343-46 (warrant-
less search). 
26. See Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985) ("reasonableness" used in terms of 
fourth amendment); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984) ("reasonable" used in both 
fourth amendment terms and "objectively reasonable" standard). For a discussion of the meaning of 
the term "reasonable" as applied by courts in considering fourth amendment claims, see infra notes 
240-53, 262-94 and accompanying text. 
27. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3038 (official's personal liability depends on "objective legal 
reasonableness" of allegedly unlawful conduct); Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-46 (standard of objective 
reasonableness determines applicability of qualified immunity). For a discussion of the meaning of 
the term "objectively reasonable" conduct as defined by courts in considering qualified immunity 
motions, see infra notes 154-209 and accompanying text. 
28. See supra notes 26-27 for the Court's two standards of "reasonable." One court has failed 
to recognize that one definition relates to the standard of reasonableness under the fourth amend-
ment and the other relates to the standard of reasonableness under section 1983. See Sevigny v. 
Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 957 (4th Cir. 1988) (qualified immunity standard effectively allows police 
officers two levels of reasonable misapprehension of constitutionality of conduct in making arrests). 
29. See infra notes 42-143 and accompanying text for a discussion of the qualified immunity 
defense. 
30. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the practical effects of the 
more recent standards. 
31. See infra notes 144-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's application 
of the Harlow standard to fourth amendment claims. 
32. 434 U.S. 555 (1977). In Procunier, the Supreme Court stated that officials do not have 
qualified immunity if they failed all three ofthe following tests: (l) the right they allegedly violated 
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standard raises both legal and factual issues: it questions what reasonable offi-
cials would have done under the circumstances (a legal issue) and it questions 
what the officials actually knew when they acted (a factual issue).34 With this 
modification, discovery is generally necessary to resolve the issue of immunity. 
Section III applies the Harlow standard for qualified immunity to claims that 
police officers used excessive force during an arrest, in violation of the fourth 
amendment and the substantive due process component of the fourteenth 
amendment. 35 Although it is clearly established that officers who violate four-
teenth amendment substantive due process by using excessive force may not as-
sert a qualified immunity defense, 36 the question of qualified immunity for 
fourth amendment claims is less clear. 
The article proposes that even though qualified immunity is appropriately 
available as a defense for other fourth amendment claims, it is an unnecessary 
defense to a fourth amendment claim challenging the use of excessive force be-
cause the standard for liability is identical to the standard for qualified immu-
nity; both question whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the use 
of force was necessary.37 Because the standards overlap, qualified immunity is 
an unnecessary defense. Some courts, however, have erroneously distinguished 
the standard for liability from the standard for immunity; they have stated that a 
court should determine the factual issues underlying the defense of qualified im-
munity and that a fact finder should determine the factual issues underlying the 
was clearly established; (2) they should have known that the right was clearly established; and 
(3) they should have known that their conduct violated the right. /d. at 562. 
33. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3040 (relevant question regarding reasonableness of warrantless 
search is objective and fact-specific). Justice Stevens, dissenting in Anderson, contended that the 
majority did not interpret or modify the Harlow standard but instead made "new law" because it 
failed to bar immunity when the law clearly established the police officers need both probable cause 
and exigent circumstances to make a warrantless search. /d. at 3043 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He 
also maintained that the Harlow standard is inapplicable when material facts are in dispute and 
resolution of these facts would determine whether officials had violated a law that is "extremely 
general," such as whether an officer had probable cause or whether a plaintift" received due process. 
/d. at 3048 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Since the Court's decision in Anderson, the Sixth Circuit implicitly agreed with Justice Stevens 
when it interpreted the Harlow standard to bar factual inquiries into what officials knew when they 
acted. See Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1267 (6th Cir. 1988). The court stated that to permit 
discovery of what officials knew would be to run "afoul of [the] Harlow [standard)." /d. Such an 
interpretation is understandable if one notes that the court did not refer to the Anderson decision. 
But see Alvarado v. Picur, 859 F.2d 448, 452 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988) (Anderson "did not establish a new 
principle of law"). For a discussion of the role of discovery in qualified immunity motions after the 
Anderson decision, see infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text. 
34. For a discussion of the terms "objective" and "subjective," see infra note 47. 
35. See infra notes 213-357 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of the 
Harlow standard to claims of fourth and fourteenth amendment violations. 
36. See infra notes 255-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of availability of 
the qualified immunity defense for substantive due process violations. 
37. In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Supreme Court defined the fourth amend-
ment standard more specifically when it discussed the use of deadly force by police officers. It de-
fined the scope of this standard by allowing police officers to use deadly force only when they 
reasonably believe that a fleeing felon poses a serious risk of harm to the officers or others. /d. at 11-
12. See infra notes 240-53, 262-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. 
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claim of excessive force, even though the factual issues are the same.38 Harlow, 
however, does not support that distinction; the standards in fact do overlap. 39 
The fact finder thus should resolve material factual disputes. In doing so, it 
simultaneously determines whether officials have qualified immunity and 
whether they violated the fourth amendment by using excessive force during an 
arrest. By recognizing that the standards for qualified immunity and liability are 
the same, courts will not confuse the fact finder by trying to explain in a jury 
instruction how unreasonable conduct nevertheless can be reasonable for the 
purpose of qualified immunity. By eliminating such confusion, a fair trial can 
occur-state officials will not get two chances to prove that their conduct was 
reasonable. When material facts are not in dispute, then the court may deter-
mined the issues by considering motions for judgment on the pleadings40 or for 
summary judgment.41 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: THE 
COURT'S ATTEMPT TO DEFINE REASONABLE CONDUCT 
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,42 the United States Supreme Court in 1982 set 
forth its current standard for qualified immunity: officials performing discre-
tionary functions are not liable if their conduct does not violate a clearly estab-
lished constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person should have 
known. 43 The Court articulated this standard after accepting and rejecting in a 
series of decisions various elements from its prior qualified immunity standards. 
It had first allowed then disallowed consideration of subjective good faith;44 it 
had emphasized then ignored the scope of an official's discretion and responsibil-
38. See, e.g., White v. Pierre County, 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986) (though court must 
decide if qualified immunity is in issue, jury decides issue of reasonable force); Skevofilax v. Quigley, 
586 F. Supp. 532, 542 (D.N.J. 1984) (determination of conduct's reasonableness properly left for 
jury, but court would determine whether qualified immunity defense applied). In section 1983 ac-
tions, it is unclear whether a right to a trial by jury exists. The seventh amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides that a right to a jury trial shall exist "[i]n suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." U.S. CoNST. amend. VII. Federal courts, 
however, have generally recognized a right to a jury trial when the amount in controversy exceeds 
twenty dollars. See, e.g., Dolence v. Flynn, 628 F.2d 1280, 1282 (lOth Cir. 1980) (prisoner entitled 
to jury trial for§ 1983 claim for money damages); see generally Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198) 
(1974) (seventh amendment applicable to fair housing claim under Title VII for monetary relief). 
39. See infra notes 261-310 and accompanying text for a discussion of the overlap of the two 
standards. Because the standards are not distinct, appellate courts should recognize that an order 
denying qualified immunity for this fourth amendment claim is not an appealable interlocutory order 
since the issue of immunity is not collateral to the underlying merits of the case. See infra notes 317-
20 and accompanying text for a discussion of how resolving the qualified immunity issue also re-
solves the underlying merits. 
40. See infra note 342 and accompanying text for a discussion of judgment on the pleadings. 
41. See infra note 343 and accompanying text for a discussion of summary judgment. 
42. 457 u.s. 800 (1982). 
43. /d. at 818. Although the majority in Anderson v. Creighton stated that it was reaffirming 
the Harlow standard, Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3040, the dissent maintained that the majority had 
discarded the Harlow standard. /d. at 3043 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 33 for Justice 
Stevens's reasoning. 
44. See infra notes 52-liS and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's change. 
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ities;4' and it had advocated then rejected different tests for determining whether 
conduct meets the "reasonableness" requirement of qualified immunity.46 In 
making these changes, the Court attempted to create a standard that was 
"wholly objective,"47 one that would allow courts to dismiss insubstantial claims 
prior to discovery.48 The Court eliminated from the standard consideration of 
an official's subjective good faith and emphasized that a standard of objective, 
not subjective, reasonableness would better promote the interests protected by 
the qualified immunity defense.49 The Court, however, failed to recognize that 
at times factual issues, such as what officials knew when they acted, required 
resolution before the issue of qualified immunity could be determined. so The 
only factual element that the Harlow Court eliminated was the question of 
whether the officials acted maliciously." Understanding the Court's current 
standard for qualified immunity requires, however, an examination of its dissat-
isfaction with prior standards. 
In 1967, the Supreme Court established in Pierson v. Ray'2 its first ambigu-
ous qualified immunity standard. It held that the "defense of good faith and 
probable cause, ... available to the officers [at] common law ... for false arrest 
and imprisonment, is also available [to police officers] in [an] action under § 
1983."'3 In dictum it also stated that police officers do not have the duty of 
45. See infra notes 57-63, 76-84 and accompanying text for an examination of the Court's 
change. 
46. See infra notes 52-118 and accompanying text for a detailed analysis of the Court's change. 
47. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984). There, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Harlow standard as rejecting "inquiry into [an official's] state of mind in favor of a wholly objective 
standard." Id. The Court's use of the terms "objective" and "subjective" in qualified immunity 
decisions, however, has been confusing. Compare Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-18 (1982) 
(objective reasonableness of actions may be resolved prior to discovery because official's subjective 
good faith, a factual issue, not relevant) with Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3041-42 & n.6 
(1987) (determining objective reasonableness of actions may require discovery because what official 
knew, a factual question, relevant). See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 517 (1985) (Harlow 
standard "purged" qualified immunity doctrine of subjective components); Comment, Who Will Pro-
tect the Police? A Need for Task Specialization in Lower Courts: Malley v. Briggs, 32 WASH. U.J. 
URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 247, 251 n.29 (1987) (terms "objective" and "subjective" used frequently, but 
their meanings confused). 
The meaning of these terms, however, has varied depending on the Court's interpretation of the 
Harlow standard. See infra notes 86-98, 178-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
interpretations. 
48. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
49. Id at 819. 
SO. See infra notes 204-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of discovery in 
qualified immunity cases. 
51. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the Court's recognition in Harlow that malice is a factual issue thwarting the goal of qualified 
immunity. 
52. 386 u.s. 547 (1967). 
53. Id. at 557. In Pierson, police officers had arrested a group of fifteen black and white minis-
ters for allegedly violating a state statute that prohibited congregating in a public place under cir-
cumstances that would cause a breach of the peace. /d. at 549-50. The ministers asserted that the 
statute was unconstitutional and that the police officers had arrested them not because the officers 
anticipated a breach of the peace, but rather because the ministers had been in a waiting room 
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"predicting the future course of constitutional law. " 54 The standard was confus-
ing because a determination that the officials had probable cause55 meant that 
the arrests would have been lawful and the officials would have no need to assert 
qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. 56 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes,57 the Court dispelled some of the confusion. The 
Court implied that the phrase "probable cause" signified not fourth amendment 
probable cause but rather "reasonable" conduct. 58 The Court explained that the 
qualified immunity standard requires both subjective good faith and a reasonable 
belief as to the validity of the challenged action, the latter element determinable 
through a totality of the circumstances test. 59 In ascertaining whether particu-
lar officials, including police officers, had acted reasonably during a student dem-
designated for whites only. /d. at 557. In determining that the police officers could assert qualified 
immunity as a defense in section 1983 actions if they had acted in good faith and with probable 
cause, the Court looked to the common law, as it had done in previous cases determining the scope 
of immunity available to state officials. /d. See also supra note 15 for a related discussion concerning 
common-law immunity. 
54. 386 U.S. at 557. 
55. The fourth amendment requires police officers to have probable cause when they conduct a 
search or seizure. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. Police officers have probable cause to arrest an individ-
ual if "the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trust-
worthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (person seized] 
had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The same 
standard applies to searches, except that it questions whether there is evidence of the crime in the 
place to be searched. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241-46 (1983) Gudge issuing warrant 
for search of car and home had substantial basis for concluding drugs were to be found there). 
56. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555-57 (defense of good faith and probable cause available to police 
officers alleged to have arrested plaintiffs in violation of Constitution). The Court's standard caused 
confusion. Judge Newman has argued that the Court's reference to probable cause is inexplicable 
because the ministers in Pierson did not assert that the arrest was without probable cause. Newman, 
Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforc-
ers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 449 (1978). In addition, he interpreted the Court's reference to 
"good faith" as raising only one issue, whether the officers had relied on a duly enacted statute. /d. 
at 459. See generally Comment, Malley v. Briggs: Application of the Harlow Objective Reasonable-
ness Test to Section 1983 Liability for Police Officers, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 333, 341 (1987) (Pierson was 
based on common law rule that if police officers lack probable cause, they had immunity only if they 
acted in subjective good faith). Other commentators, however, have interpreted "probable cause" 
and "good faith" as elements leading the Court to establish an immunity standard composed of both 
objective and subjective elements. See, e.g., Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional 
Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 526, 555 (1977) (use of both terms mis-
guided and caused much confusion); Note, Police Immunity fram Civil Suit, 20 CREIGHTON L. REv. 
193, 203-04 (1986) (probable cause together with good faith is basis for qualified immunity). In 
addition, the Second Circuit stated that the Supreme Court's requirement of probable cause did not 
mean that officers had to establish "probable cause in the constitutional sense," but instead only a 
"reasonable belief" in the validity of the arrest. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court and some commenta-
tors have agreed with the Second Circuit's interpretation of Pierson's "probable cause" requirement. 
See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987); S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES LmGATION: THE LAW OF SECfiON 1983 § 8.11, at 489 (2d ed. 1986); see infra 
notes 178-210 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point. 
57. 416 u.s. 232 (1974). 
58. /d. at 247-48. 
59. /d. 
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onstration, the Court considered "the scope of discretion and responsibilities of 
the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time. "60 
Under the Scheuer standard, officials could properly assert immunity if they had 
acted both in good faith and reasonably under the circumstances. 
The Court stated that this standard furthere<I the policy underlying all im-
munity decisions; officials must be able to act decisively, without fear ofliability, 
in enforcing laws that protect the public.61 The Court explained that the doc-
trines of absolute and qualified immunity recognize and accept some errors by 
officials because it is unjust to hold officials liable when they have acted in good 
faith. 62 The Scheuer standard explicitly recognized the need to relate the scope 
of an official's discretion with the scope of qualified immunity, a need later re-
jected by the Court. 63 
One year after articulating a totality of the circumstances test for determin-
ing reasonable conduct (a standard applicable to all officials performing discre-
tionary functions), a majority ofthe Court in Wood v. Strickland 64 attempted to 
establish a standard that would apply only to school officials who have allegedly 
violated a student's constitutional rights.6s Four justices, however, dissented, 
arguing that the Court should adhere to the reasonableness standard set forth in 
Scheuer. 66 Although both the majority and the dissent agreed that officials must 
act in subjective good faith,67 they disagreed as to the content of Scheuer's sec-
ond requirement, that officials also act reasonably.68 The Wood majority, de-
parting from the Scheuer standard, stated that a school board member has 
qualified immunity unless he or she "reasonably should have known that the 
action he [or she] took within his [or her] sphere of official responsibility would 
violate the constitutional rights of the student affected."69 The majority ex-
plained that school officials have a duty to know "clearly established rights," 
probably including rights that are "settled," "indisputable," "unquestioned," 
and "basic."70 It warned, however, that school board members, like police of-
60. ld. at 247. 
61. Id. at 241. 
62. Id. at 240. 
63. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 556-66 (1978) (qualified immunity applied to low-
ranking prison officials without regard to their particular scope of discretion). 
64. 420 u.s. 308 (1975). 
65. !d. at 322. In Wood, two students alleged a violation of their constitutional right to sub-
stantive and procedural due process before their dismissal from school for spiking punch served 
during a school function. I d. at 310-11. The Supreme Court did not find a violation of substantive 
due process, but remanded the case for a determination of whether there had been a violation of 
procedural due process. Id. at 326-27. 
66. Id. at 330-31 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
67. See id. at 321-22 (majority opinion); id. at 330-31 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority 
described subjective "good faith" as a "belief that [one] is doing right," and the absence of a "mali-
cious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights." !d. at 321-22. The Court described 
malicious conduct when it stated that officials cannot properly assert immunity if they knew that 
they were violating a plaintiff's clearly established rights. Id. at 322. 
68. Id. at 330-31 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
69. ld. at 322. 
70. Id. at 321-22. See, e.g., Walsh v. Franco, 849 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1988) (government 
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ficers, do not have a duty to predict " 'the future course of constitutional 
law.' •m The Wood standard thus defined the reasonableness prong of qualified 
immunity by measuring reasonableness in terms of clearly established rights, an 
interpretation, according to the Wood dissent, that limited the availability of 
qualified immunity.72 
In examining the school officials' discretion and responsibilities, the Court, 
in contrast to its prior decisions, used the official's high position as a reason for 
narrowing, not expanding, the scope of immunity.73 The Court explained that 
because school board members should possess a "high degree of intelligence," 
the Wood standard for qualified immunity properly balanced student interests 
against officials' need to act. 74 
The Wood standard for qualified immunity was later applied to other offi-
cials. 75 In applying the standard to prison officials, the Court, in Procunier v. 
Navarette, 76 adhered to Wood's requirement that officials act in good faith, 77 but 
officials deemed to have knowledge and respect for basic unquestioned constitutional rights). The 
dissent in Wood argued that the majority presumed that its description of rights as "settled" and 
"indisputable" also encompassed rights that are "basic" and "unquestioned." Wood, 420 U.S. at 329 
(Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent was prescient in recognizing that these terms would cause se-
mantic nightmares. 
71. Wood, 420 U.S. at 322 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967)). 
72. /d. at 327 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
73. /d. at 320-22. In articulating a special standard of qualified immunity for school officials, 
the Court rejected its prior approach of determining whether the duties performed by the particular 
officials are similar to duties performed by other officials who have absolute, not qualified, immunity. 
Even though the majority recognized that school board members often perform functions similar to 
the absolutely protected functions performed by legislators, judges, and prosecutors, it nevertheless 
rejected the school board members' assertion of absolute immunity. /d. at 319-20. The majority 
facilely concluded that absolute immunity would not "sufficiently increase the ability of school offi-
cials to exercise their discretion in a forthright manner to warrant the absence of a remedy." /d. at 
320. 
74. ld at 320-22. 
75. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-07 (1978) (various federal officials); 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (mental health officials); Procunier v. Navarette, 
434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978) (prison officials). See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Navarette. The Court found the Scheuer standard applicable to various federal officials. 
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). In Butz, the Court stated, "We ... hold that, in a 
suit for damages arising from unconstitutional action, federal executive officials exercising discretion 
are entitled only to the qualified immunity specified in Scheuer, subject to those exceptional situa-
tions where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public 
business." /d. The Court did mention Wood and its duty to know clearly established law, but in its 
holding it relied on Scheuer. /d. at 484, 485, 498, 506-07. 
The Court considered the duties performed by the following federal officials: the secretary and 
assistant secretary of agricuiture, a judicial officer and chief hearing examiner, several officials in the 
Commodity Exchange Authority, and the department's attorney who prosecuted the plaintiff for 
failing to comply with the department's financial requirements for sellers of futures. /d. at 481-82. 
In contrast to its analysis in Wood, the Court employed a functional analysis, which provided abso-
lute immunity for tasks performed in the capacity of a judge or prosecutor. ld at 508-17. In Butz, 
the Court did not, however, distinguish between the Scheuer standard and the Wood standard. 
76. 434 u.s. 555 (1978). 
77. /d. at 562. In Navarette, a state prisoner alleged that three supervisory prison officials and 
three of their subordinates had negligently interfered with his outgoing mail, in violation of the first 
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interpreted Wood's reasonableness requirement to provide broader protection to 
state officials. 78 
The Court in Navarette interpreted Wood's reasonableness requirement as 
posing three subissues: officials would not have immunity "if the constitutional 
right allegedly infringed by them was clearly established at the time of their 
challenged conduct, if they ... should have known of that right, and if they ... 
should have known that their conduct violated the constitutional norm. " 79 In 
considering the first subissue, whether the right was clearly established, the 
Court found that neither its decisions nor the decisions of the courts of appeals, 
nor the decisions of the district courts, established the asserted constitutional 
right. 80 It determined that because the officials had acted reasonably and with 
subjective good faith they had qualified immunity. 81 The Navarette standard, 
with its three subissues, greatly expanded the availability of qualified immunity. 
In broadly defining Wood's reasonableness requirement, the Court failed to 
consider how the scope of immunity related to the scope of the officials' discre-
tion and responsibilities. 82 In his dissent, Justice Stevens properly noted that the 
majority "seems to rely on an unarticulated notion that prison administrators 
deserve as much immunity as [other officials]."83 Justice Stevens contended that 
the Court significantly changed the Wood test by failing to focus on the facts of 
each case. 84 
After its decision in Navarette, which expanded Wood's reasonableness 
standard for qualified immunity, the Court articulated its current standard in 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 85 In Harlow, the Court held that "government officials 
amendment to the United States Constitution. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 556-5S. The Court held that 
the prison officials had qualified immunity because they satisfied both the subjective and objective 
prongs of the Wood test. /d. at 565-66. The Court interpreted Wood's "malicious intention" prong 
as requiring intentional conduct as defined by section SA of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. /d. 
(citing REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ SA (1965)). Section SA provides that individuals act 
intentionally if "the consequences are substantially certain to result" from their acts. /d. § SA, at 15. 
7S. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 561-65 (in many cases, effect of Navarette's restrictive application of 
requirement of clearly settled law will result in absolute immunity). This narrowing caused some 
commentators to question whether the qualified immunity standard actually afforded absolute im-
munity. See, e.g., Nahmod, Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies.· Executive Official Immunity, 
62 WASH. U.L.Q. 221, 243 n.l30 (19S4). 
79. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 562. 
SO. /d. at 565. For a discussion of which decisions indicate that a right is clearly established, 
see infra note 130. 
Sl. 434 U.S. at 562. The Court therefore determined that it need not consider the other two 
subissues. /d. at 565 n.l3. 
S2. The Court not only did not consider whether the common law affords officials immunity, 
but it also did not consider whether the policies underlying section 19S3 support a finding of quali-
fied immunity. 
S3. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 569 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
S4. Id. at 569. 
S5. 457 U.S. SOO (19S2). In Harlow, a former federal employee claimed that two White House 
aides had conspired with President Nixon and others to deprive him of statutory and constitutional 
rights. Id. at S02. After extensive discovery, id. at S03, the district court denied the White House 
aides' motion for summary judgment, finding that they were not entitled to absolute immunity and 
that a factual dispute prevented summary judgment. /d. at S05-06. The Supreme Court, however, 
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performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. "86 The 
Court also stated that when a right is "clearly established," officials may assert 
extraordinary circumstances as an exception by proving that they neither knew 
nor should have known of the right. 87 
In articulating the new standard, which the Harlow Court described as "es-
sentially" and "primarily" objective, 88 the majority rejected some aspects of the 
Wood/Navarette standard while adhering to others. It explicitly rejected 
Wood's subjective good faith requirement because it hypothesized that consider-
ation of this factual issue often forced officials to engage in discovery and to go . 
to trial even if the plaintiffs' claims were insubstantial. 89 By refusing to consider 
whether the officials had acted maliciously, the majority stated that motions for 
summary judgment by officials could be resolved prior to discovery.90 The 
Court, however, explicitly adopted part of the Wood/Navarette requirement that 
the conduct be reasonable. It found that officials would be immune if the vio-
lated rights were not clearly established.91 The Court stated that if the asserted 
right was clearly established, then the defense of qualified immunity would not 
be available unless the officials could establish extraordinary circumstances. 92 
The majority noted that "reasonably competent public officials" have a duty to 
know "the law governing [their] conduct."93 The Court did not, however, ex-
plicitly refer to the third subissue posed in Navarette-whether the officials 
should have known that their conduct violated a clearly established constitu-
tional right.94 
In explaining how to apply the new standard, the Court described the stan-
remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether under certain circumstances the officials 
had absolute immunity, and if not, whether they had qualified immunity under the new standard set 
forth in its decision. Id. at 813-20. 
86. Id. at 818. 
87. Id. at 819. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 815-18. The Court declared that by eliminating the subjective good faith inquiry 
from the standard, officials would no longer have to defend "insubstantial suits," a concern the 
Court discussed six times in its opinion. Id. at 813-14, 816, 818, 820 n.36. The Court first expressed 
this concern in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly 
terminated under principle of qualified immunity). 
90. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-19. For a discussion of the procedural aspects of raising the de-
fense of qualified immunity, see infra notes 311-57 and accompanying text. 
91. 457 U.S. at 818-19. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. In its brief to the Court in Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987}, the government 
argued that Harlow did not reject this subissue when promulgating the standard for qualified immu-
nity. Brief for Petitioner at 15-25, Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987) (No. 85-1520). To 
support its argument, the government quoted Harlow: " 'Where an official could be expected to 
know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to 
hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action.' " I d. 
at 15 n.8 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added in brief)). The Harlow Court, however, 
emphasized that its standard not only focused on the "objective legal reasonableness of an official's 
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dard as focusing attention on the "objective reasonableness of an official's con-
duct [, which is to be] ... measured by reference to clearly established law."9s 
The Court, however, did not define what it meant by "clearly established."96 
The Harlow Court declared that the new "objective" standard properly bal-
anced the interests protected by qualified immunity.97 It concluded that the 
prior standard, by requiring consideration of the factual issue of subjective good 
faith, had caused unnecessary costs, such as forcing officials to defend meritless 
claims.98 
In his concurrence in Harlow, Justice Brennan recommended adding a sub-
jective component to the standard, 99 thus undermining the purpose of the revi-
sion. He stated that officials are not only liable when they should have known 
that they were violating a plaintiff's rights, but also when they actually knew 
they were violating those rights. 100 He noted that under the Harlow standard 
"some measure of discovery" would be necessary to determine what the officials 
knew at the time of their actions. 101 He also explained that the Court's standard 
acts" but also permitted resolution of the issue of immunity prior to discovery. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 
818. 
The Court's decision in Anderson indicates that it implicitly adopted the third subissue of Nava-
rette as it interpreted the Harlow standard to question whether the contours of the asserted right 
gave officials notice that their conduct was unlawful. See supra note 79 and accompanying text for 
the third subissue posed in Navarette. See infra notes 204-11 for a discussion of the Anderson Court's 
implicit adoption of this third subissue. 
95. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (Court did not determine whether its decisions or decisions of 
other court would be dispositive). 
96. For a discussion of the term "clearly established," see infra note 135. 
97. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19. The Court first emphasized that any qualified immunity stan-
dard imposes general social costs because it sometimes allows officials to be held liable for their 
actions. /d. at 816. It described these general costs as including the cost of paying for litigation, the 
cost of distracting public officials from their duties, the cost of deterring qualified people from seek-
ing public office, and the cost of making officials more reluctant to exercise their discretion. /d. 
98. /d. at 816-17. The Court noted that the prior standard afforded plaintiffs the right to con-
duct extensive discovery. /d. at 817. The Court noted that when the defense of qualified immunity 
involves inquiry into an official's state of mind, summary judgment generally is not possible. /d. at 
817 n.29: "It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff's counsel to create a material issue of fact on some 
element of the immunity defense where subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's 
mental processes are involved." /d. The Court questioned whether plaintiffs should force officials to 
explain how their experiences, emotions, and values led them to exercise their discretion. /d. at 816-
17. The Court also stated that its prior standard caused severe disruption because it allowed plain-
tiffs to depose not only the officials but also their colleagues. /d. at 817. 
99. /d. at 820-21 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
100. /d. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring). One commentator has appropriately noted that the 
concurrence's proposed revision would perpetuate the problems the Court was attempting to solve 
by eliminating the subjective good faith inquiry from the qualified immunity defense. See Balcerzak, 
Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problems of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil 
Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126, 134 n.36 (1985). In Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034 
(1987), the Supreme Court, however, modified the Harlow standard in a manner that re-creates the 
problems that the Court sought to eliminate in Harlow. See infra notes 204-11 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the modification of the Harlow standard in Anderson. 
101. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring). He emphasized, however, that discov-
ery would not be necessary when the law was "so ambiguous" at the time of the alleged violation 
that no one could thus know that the right existed and when the plaintiff failed to survive a motion 
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applied to all officials, 102 a viewpoint recently adopted by a majority of the 
Court. 103 The Harlow standard for qualified immunity was not accepted by the 
entire Court as was the Scheuer standard. 104 
After Harlow, lower courts were uncertain as to how to apply the new stan-
dard. Although the Harlow Court had stated that the standard was "essen-
tially" or "primarily" objective, 105 lower courts questioned whether the 
standard at times permitted inquiry into an officer's state of mind. 106 Two years 
after Harlow, the Court, in Davis v. Scherer, 107 attempted to clarify the stan-
dard.108 The Scherer Court declared the standard to be "wholly objective'' 109 
because it afforded immunity when an official's act was objectively reasonable 
"'as measured by clearly established law.' " 110 The Court also announced that 
"[n]o other 'circumstances' are relevant to the issues of qualified immunity.'' 111 
Although the Court declared that the Harlow standard was to be "wholly 
objective," the procedural due process claim before the Scherer Court did not 
invite inquiry into an official's state of mind. 112 The claim instead required the 
Court to consider whether the law was "clearly established" and whether the 
officials had acted unreasonably when they allegedly violated state administra-
tive regulations. 113 The Court determined that although the law clearly indi-
cated that "some kind of a hearing" was necessary before firing the plaintiff, 114 it 
found that it had never specified "minimally acceptable procedures for termina-
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. /d. (Brennan, J., concurring). One commentator has argued 
that officials were liable for violating "fringe rights" under the Wood test if they acted maliciously. 
See Balcerzak, supra note 100, at 131 (Wood standard had subjective component that denied quali-
fied immunity if official acted with malicious intent and relevant constitutional right not clearly 
established). 
102. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
103. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point. 
104. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 233-50 (1974) (unanimous opinion). 
105. 457 U.S. at 819. 
106. See, e.g., McElveen v. County of Prince William, 725 F.2d 954, 957-58 (4th Cir.) 
(although Harlow Court indicated that good-faith defense turns primarily on objective factors, it did 
not hold that exclusively objective standard was to be applied to claims proceeding to trial), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); see also Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 31 (lst Cir. 1984) (after 
· Harlow, defendant's knowledge still relevant in fourth amendment claim asserting official intention-
ally misrepresented facts in affidavit for warrant). 
107. 468 u.s. 183 (1984). 
108. /d. at 185-97 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, 
JJ.). Dissenting as to the Court's application of the Harlow standard were Justices Blackmon, Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Stevens. /d. at 197-206 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
In Davis, state officials had failed to provide a dismissed police officer with a pretermination 
hearing or a prompt post-termination hearing in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. /d. at 185-89. The officials had also violated clear 
state administrative regulations. /d. at 188-89. 
109. /d. at 191. 
110. /d. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
111. /d. 
112. See generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 340-41 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(procedural due process claim does not require court to consider official's state of mind). 
113. Davis, 468 U.S. at 190-97. 
114. /d. at 192 n.lO. 
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tion. " 11 s The Scherer Court found that even though the abstract law was clear, 
i.e., that there must be "some kind of a hearing," its application was not 
clear. 116 The Court also established that officials do not act unreasonably sim-
ply because they violate state administrative regulations. 117 The Court reasoned 
that considering violations of state law would "disrupt" the proper balance of 
interests for a variety of reasons: state officials often have difficulty complying 
with and enforcing the plethora of ambiguous state rules, courts would struggle 
to interpret them, and officials would then have to defend even frivolous suits. 118 
The Court's concern with protecting officials from defending insubstantial 
suits continued in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 119 where a plurality of the Court120 stated 
that officials could appeal from a district court's interlocutory order denying 
them qualified immunity. 121 In recognizing the right to an immediate appeal, 
the plurality stated that such an appeal would further the goal of the Harlow 
standard by providing "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liabil-
ity."122 The plurality again characterized the standard as objective, stating that 
the new standard had "purged qualified immunity ... of its subjective compo-
nents."123 The plurality explained that when a reviewing court evaluates a 
lower court's denial of qualified immunity, it considers only the legal question of 
whether the alleged conduct violated clearly established law. 124 The Mitchell 
plurality, however, noted that the Harlow standard at times may afford a plain-
tiff the right to discovery prior to resolution of the motion for qualified 
115. /d. 
116. /d. at 185-93. The dissent, however, argued that the officials had failed to provide the 
police officer with "meaningful notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard," the essence of the 
right to due process. /d. at 200 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
117. /d. at 195-96. 
118. /d. The dissent, however, found that violations of state law provide an objective means of 
knowing whether officials acted reasonably, a means it found more helpful than the Court's "post hoc 
parsing of cases." /d. at 204 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
119. 472 u.s. 511 (1985). 
120. In Mitchell, only seven justices participated in the decision: Justice White wrote the opin-
ion for the Court, in which only Justice Blackmun joined, id. at 513-36; four justices concurred and 
dissented in part, id. at 536-58 (Burger, C.J., and O'Connor, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
121. /d. at 524-30. For a discussion of interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity motions, see 
infra notes 311-13. 
122. 472 U.S. at 526 (emphasis in original). 
123. /d. at 517. 
124. /d. at 528. In describing this review, the plurality confusingly described the reviewing 
court's task when considering the facts alleged by the plaintiff and the facts alleged by the defendant 
official. See id. The plurality stated that in considering the facts alleged by the plaintiff the review-
ing court examines only one issue--whether the law was "clearly established"; however, the plural-
ity implied that a reviewing court considering the facts alleged by the defendant examines two 
issues-whether the official's "conduct violated clearly established law" and whether "the law 
clearly proscribed the actions the [official] claims he took." /d. The plurality's description probably 
signifies that even three years after Harlow it still was not sure about the relationship between the 
third prong of Navarette-whether the officials should have known that their conduct violated 
clearly established law-and the first prong of Navarette-whether the official violated clearly estab-
lished law. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of Navarette. 
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immunity. 125 
In applying Harlow, the Mitchell plurality discussed how clear the law must 
be for a court to find an officialliable. 126 Although it found the issue before the 
Court to be an "open question" because no court had previously declared the 
challenged conduct unconstitutional, 127 the plurality warned that courts never-
theless may find officials liable even if there was no decision with identical cir-
cumstances.l28 It stated that a case on point was unnecessary.l29 The plurality 
explained that officials have immunity only when there was "a legitimate ques-
tion" as to the lawfulness of their conduct. 130 The Mitchell plurality helped to 
define what constituted "clearly established law." 
The evolution of the affirmative defense of qualified immunity thus reveals 
the Court's attempt to articulate a standard that sufficiently protects officials 
from having to defend insubstantial suits. In setting forth the Harlow standard, 
the Court attempted, but failed, to create a standard that raises only a legal 
issue. The Court erroneously assumed that officials' subjective knowledge of the 
law was the only factual issue that could have been relevant to the issue of quali-
fied immunity. Some factual issues, such as what the officials knew when they 
decided to act, sometimes would need to be established before the issue of quali-
fied immunity could be resolved. The Harlow Court did not recognize that these 
factual issues would often subject officials to discovery, thereby defeating its pol-
icy objective. 
The evolution of the qualified immunity defense also reveals how the Court 
has continued to expand the protection available to officials. First, the Court 
found that officials, who act with some discretion, are immune if they should not 
have known that they were violating a plaintiff's clearly established constitu-
tional or statutory rights. 131 The Court implicitly rejected the Scheuer standard, 
which considered the position of the officials and related the scope of immunity 
to the scope of the officials' discretion and responsibilities. Under the Scheuer 
125. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (Harlow recognized that discovery to be avoided if possible). 
The Court in Harlow, however, never hinted that discovery is sometimes appropriate. The Court 
had stated, "Until [the] threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed." 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
126. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 535 & n.l2. 
127. Id. at 534-35. In determining whether a warrantless domestic wiretap conducted for na-
tional security purposes violated clearly established law at the time of the wiretap, the Court ex-
amined the practice of the Justice Department throughout six administrations and the decisions of 
the district courts and the courts of appeal. /d. 
128. Id. at 535 n.l2. 
129. /d. 
130. /d. The difficulty of applying and interpreting the Harlow standard was apparent in 
Mitchell. Justice Brennan, joined only by Justice Marshall, properly noted that the attorney gen-
eral's purpose in conducting the wiretap was a disputed material fact, one barring summary judg-
ment. Id. at 543-58 (Brennan, J., concurring). The attorney general had admitted at a hearing 
before the district court that the wiretap was not done in his capacity as a prosecutor. Id. at 515. 
Justice Brennan contended that this admission did not signify that the tap was not done for the 
purpose of spying on a political opponent, an act that would violate clearly established law. /d. at 
556-58 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
131. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982). 
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standard, the Court had questioned whether officials in positions of responsibil-
ity, which typically require a high degree of intelligence, should have known that 
they were violating a plaintiff's clearly established rights. 132 In Harlow, the 
Court abandoned such examination. 
Second, the Court expanded the scope of immunity by creating a reasona-
bleness standard that would be "measured by reference to clearly established 
law." 133 Officials lose their immunity only when constitutional or statutory 
rights are "clearly established." Although any immunity standard shelters some 
constitutional violations, the requirement that such rights be "clearly estab-
lished" provides officials with extensive protection. 134 In addition, the Court 
failed to explain the phrase "clearly established right." 13' Even though the 
132. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). 
133. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
134. Professor Davis has questioned the Court's use of the term "clearly established." 5 K. 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 27:24, at 130 (2d ed. 1984). He has questioned 
whether courts can distinguish clearly established rights from established rights. /d. Even if courts 
can do so, Davis argued, the Court's standard affords broad immunity. Id He noted that "[l]aw 
that can be clearly stated in the abstract usually becomes unclear when applied to variable and 
imperfectly understood facts." Id (quoted with approval in Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 1176 
(1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). 
135. Courts have disagreed as to the degree of factual correspondence required in order to 
determine that officials violated a clearly established right. Two approaches have been dominant. 
One requires a relatively strict factual correspondence between the officials' actions and the case law. 
See, e.g., Savidge v. Fincannon, 836 F.2d 898, 910 (5th Cir. 1988) (Gee, J., dissenting) (rights must 
be so clearly settled and defined that knowledge of their existence is commonplace among the edu-
cated and failure to recognize them implies their willful disregard); Abel v. Miller, 824 F.2d 1522, 
1533 (7th Cir. 1987) (test for immunity should be whether law was clear in relation to specific facts 
confronting public official when he acted) (quoting Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 307-08 (7th 
Cir. 1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (facts must "closely correspond"), cert. 
denied, 107 S. Ct. 172 (1986); see also Nahmod, supra note 78, at 253 n.l68 (after Supreme Court's 
decision in Davis v. Scherer, "a case on point" seems necessary); see generally Walsh v. Franco, 849 
F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1988) (even if both general law and contours of asserted right "clearly deline-
ated," officials may have immunity). The other approach requires officials to "apply general, well-
developed legal principles." Garrett v. Rader, 831 F.2d 202, 205 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1987). See also 
Eastwood v. Dept. of Corrections of Oklahoma, 846 F.2d 627, 630 (lOth Cir. 1988) (unlawfulness 
must be "apparent" in light of pre-existing law); McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1325 (4th Cir. 
1987) (officials must consider clearly established principles), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1731 (1988); 
People of Three-Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(clearly established principles must lie violated). 
One commentator has noted that a few courts have adopted a third approach, one that requires 
officials to "discern trends" in the law and to base their conduct on these trends. Comment, Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity under Section 
1983, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 901, 930-32 (1984). This latter approach, however, is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court's repeated admonition that officials do not have the duty of "predicting the future 
course of constitutional law." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (quoting Pierson v. 
Ray, 386 u.s. 547, 557 (1967)). 
Those courts applying the most stringent approach have created an exception to the rule of 
strict or close factual correspondence, stating that "egregious" conduct may render officials liable 
even if there is no case law addressing "the specific facts at issue." Benson, 786 F.2d at 276 n.l8; 
accord Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 173 n.10 (lst Cir. 1986) (quoting Benson, 786 F.2d at 276 
n.l8)). The Seventh Circuit, which adheres to a strict factual correspondence approach, articulated 
this exception in response to the problem that arises when the asserted constitutional right requires a 
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Court stated that officials have immunity if there was a "legitimate question" of 
court to balance the interests of the parties. Benson, 786 F.2d at 276. The court noted that when it 
must balance the interests of the parties, the general law may be clearly established, but that the 
application of the general law is "so fact dependent that the 'law' can rarely be considered 'clearly 
established.' " /d. 
In an attempt to define the term "clearly established," some courts and commentators have 
related it to the Supreme Court's test for determining whether a decision should be applied retroac-
tively in a civil or criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Acoffv. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543, 1548-50 (lith Cir. 
1985); Nahmod, supra note 78, at 253-55. In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), the Supreme 
Court recently changed its test for determining whether a decision should be applied retroactively in 
a criminal proceeding by holding that a decision that constitutes a "clear break" from past precedent 
should nevertheless be applied retroactively to cases on direct review. Id at 326-28. The Court 
stated that its prior test considered three factors in determining whether a decision should be applied 
retroactively: (I) whether the new decision applied settled precedents to a different set of facts; 
(2) whether the new decision declared that the trial court lacked the authority to convict a defend-
ant; and (3) whether the new decision constituted a clear break with past precedent. /d. at 324. The 
Court stated that an affirmative answer to the first two issues indicates that the decision should be 
applied retroactively. /d. In contrast to its prior decisions, the Court held that a decision that 
constituted a clear break could be applied retroactively to decisions on direct review. /d. at 326-28. 
It stated that it previously had held that a decision should not be retroactively applied if it consti-
tuted a clear break with previous decisions because law enforcement officials would have relied on 
the prior decisions and retroactive application would adversely affect the administration of justice. 
/d. at 324-25. In rejecting the clear-break exception, the Court found more compelling that the 
integrity of judicial review requires courts to retroactively apply new decisions. Id at 326-28. 
The test for determining whether decisions should be applied retroactively in civil proceeding is 
similar to the test for retroactivity in criminal proceedings. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 
97 ( 1971 ), the Supreme Court articulated the following three factors for determining retroactivity in 
civil proceedings: (1) whether the decision establishes a new principle of law; (2) whether the history 
of the rule in question supports retroactive application; and (3) whether retroactive application 
would produce "substantial inequitable results." Id at 106-07. 
The Eleventh Circuit applied both the civil and the criminal standard when it determined that 
the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 22 (1985), which declared that a 
state statute authorizing the use of deadly force to stop a fleeing felon violated the fourth amend-
ment, should be applied retroactively in a section 1983 action. Acoff, 762 F.2d at 1548-50. It none-
theless stated that the issue of retroactivity is different from the issue of immunity, even though both 
consider the novelty of the decision. Id at 1549-50. The court implicitly found that even if a deci-
sion did not constitute a "clear break," the law may nevertheless not have been clearly established at 
the time the officials acted. Id at 1548-50. See generally Nahmod, supra note 78 at 253-54 (some if 
not all factors specified in Chevron to be applied in constitutional tort qualified immunity cases). 
Thus, the task of defining the term "clearly established" is difficult. The best approach to deter-
mining whether a law is clearly established is to require some, but not strict, factual correspondence 
between the officials' actions and the case law. See Comment, supra, at 933-34 (flexible approach 
considering general principles of law better serves purposes of § 1983 than strict factual correspon-
dence approach). As the Third Circuit has stated, to require strict factual correspondence would be 
to permit "officials one liability-free violation." People of Three Mile Island, 747 F.2d at 145. Re-
quiring some factual correspondence is consistent with the Supreme Court's immunity decisions and 
its recognition in Griffith that judicial integrity requires the courts to recognize constitutional viola-
tions, even though law enforcement officials may have relied on past decisions. See supra notes 85-
118 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. A duty to extrapolate guidelines from 
existing case law furthers the policy underlying the enactment of section 1983, to provide a remedy 
for constitutional violations. Plaintiffs alleging constitutional rights that require the courts to bal-
ance the interests of the parties should not be deprived of a remedy simply because the outcome of 
the balancing process is not always clear. By recognizing that officials have a duty to know and 
apply general law, courts properly balance the interests protected by the Harlow standard of immu-
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law, the Court did not specify which courts may indicate that a right is clearly 
established. 136 Nor did it explain how to interpret a conflict among the courts, 
that is, whether for the purpose of qualified immunity officials must comply with 
their own circuit's interpretation of the law, even if the interpretation conflicts 
with interpretations by other circuits. 137 
Finally, the Court revealed the extreme breadth of immunity available 
under Harlow when it modified that standard by broadly interpreting the phrase 
"clearly established law" in the recent cases of Malley v. Briggs 138 and Anderson 
v. Creighton. 139 In these cases, the Court addressed whether certain fourth 
amendment rights were clearly established. 140 The Court found that even if a 
general principle of law was clearly established, officials nonetheless have immu-
nity if reasonable officers would not have known that their actions under the 
circumstances were ui:llawful. 141 By interpreting Harlow as posing two ques-
tions-whether the right was clearly established and, if so, whether the officials 
nity. This balance thus suggests that officials or their employers should pay the cost of compliance, 
even if there is the possibility of overdeterrence of official action. See Nahmod, supra note 78, at 
256-57 (because subjective part of qualified immunity test is gone, it is more important than ever that 
scope of qualified immunity not be expanded such that there will be less incentive for compliance 
with fourteenth amendment). 
136. The Supreme Court has twice refused to indicate which courts may put officials on notice 
that a right is clearly established. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.32 (1982); 
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. SSS, S6S (1978). In attempting to resolve this open question, courts 
have specified different standards. Some courts have stated that decisions by only the Supreme 
Court, a court of appeals, or a state's highest court may indicate that a right is clearly established. 
See, e.g., Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1988); Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157, 1161 
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 969 (1981). Some courts have considered district court opin-
ions in determining whether a right was clearly established. See, e.g., Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 
173 (1st Cir. 1986). Others have found that a decision by a district court outside its circuit does not 
support a finding that a right is clearly established. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Wainwright, 839 F.2d 
1422, 1424-25 (11th Cir. 1987). Some courts have stated that a right may be clearly established even 
if the Supreme Court or their own circuit has not specified the right. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Serv. 
Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 
1467 (9th Cir. 1984); Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543, lSSO (11th Cir. 1985). But see Bilbrey v. 
Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting) (need controlling authority to 
establish a right). Some courts have also stated that a ruling from their own circuit court is sufficient 
to clearly establish a right. See, e.g., Savidge v. Fincannon, 836 F.2d 898, 908 (Sth Cir. 1988); 
Metcalf v. Long, 615 F. Supp. 1108, 1122 (D. Del. 1985). 
137. The courts of appeals of both the Ninth and Tenth circuits have agreed that decisions by 
other circuits are relevant, but not controlling, in determining whether a right is clearly established. 
See Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988); 
Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512, ISIS (9th Cir. 1985). The Tenth Circuit explained that the 
decisions of other courts are not controlling because its circuit is free to recognize a constitutional 
right explicitly rejected by other circuits. Garcia, 817 F.2d at 658. But see Savidge v. Fincannon, 
836 F.2d 898, 910 (Sth Cir. 1988) (Gee, J., dissenting) (conflict among circuits indicates that right 
not clearly established). 
138. 475 u.s. 335 (1986). 
139. 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987). 
140. For a discussion of Malley, see infra notes I 54-77 and accompanying text; for a discussion 
of Anderson, see infra notes 178-211 and accompanying text. 
141. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3038-39; Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45. See infra notes 144-211 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. 
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should have known that their conduct was unconstitutional-the Court modi-
fied and expanded the Harlow immunity standard. 142 It implicitly adopted the 
reasonableness requirement of Navarette, a decision that caused some commen-
tators to question whether this new immunity standard in practice provided ab-
solute immunity. 143 
II. THE CoURT'S RECENT APPLICATION OF HARLOW To ALLEGED FOURTH 
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS 
The Court has continued to expand the scope of qualified immunity. In 
Malley v. Briggs 144 and Anderson v. Creighton, 145 the Court applied the Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald 146 standard to two different fourth amendment claims. In Malley, 
an official allegedly violated the fourth amendment by arresting individuals pur-
suant to an invalid warrant; 147 in Anderson, the alleged violation was a warrant-
less search unsupported by probable cause and absent exigent circumstances. 148 
Although in both cases the alleged conduct was unreasonable within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment and the applicable fourth amendment law was 
clearly established, the Court stated that conduct unreasonable under the fourth 
amendment nevertheless could be objectively reasonable for the purpose of 
granting qualified immunity. 149 In finding immunity possible under such cir-
cumstances, the Court implicitly interpreted Harlow as incorporating the third 
prong of Procunier v. Navarette's 150 reasonableness test-whether the officers 
should have known that their conduct was unconstitutional. 151 By looking to 
Navarette, the Court expanded the scope of immunity under Harlow by holding 
that officers may have immunity if they reasonably, though erroneously, believe 
that their actions under the specific circumstances do not violate clearly estab-
lished general principles of fourth amendment law. 152 In defining the Harlow 
standard to include a fact-specific issue-whether the officers should have 
known that their conduct was unlawful-a majority of the Court for the first 
time acknowledged that discovery was sometimes necessary before the issue of 
qualified immunity could be resolved. 153 Discovery was now permissible be-
142. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3042; Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-46. 
143. See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 78, at 222 (in doing away with subjective part of qualified 
immunity test, Supreme Court went far towards converting qualified to absolute immunity). 
144. 475 u.s. 335 (1986). 
145. 107 s. Ct. 3034 (1987). 
146. 457 u.s. 800 (1982). 
147. Malley, 475 U.S. at 337-39. See infra notes 154-77 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of this case. 
148. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3037-38. See infra notes 178-211 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of this case. 
149. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3040-41; Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-46. See infra notes 154-211 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of these cases. 
150. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). 
151. Id. at 562. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of Navarette. 
152. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3039 (qualified immunity protects official action unless action's 
unlawfulness apparent). See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of how An-
derson expanded the scope of immunity. 
153. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3042 n.6 (discovery may be necessary where defendant's ver-
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cause of the need to determine the subjective, factual issue of what the officials 
knew when they acted. The modified Harlow standard has both objective and 
subjective components: it questions whether a reasonable officer would have ac-
ted similarly and what the individual officer actually knew before acting. 
In Malley v. Briggs, the Supreme Court determined that police officers who 
obtain an invalid arrest warrant154 from a magistrate may assert qualified, but 
not absolute, immunity, Iss because the Harlow standard of qualified immunity 
sufficiently protects officers by affording them immunity unless they violated 
clearly established law. 156 The Court also explained how to apply the Harlow 
standard in that context by relying on United States v. Leon, IS7 in which the 
Court applied the Harlow standard in criminal proceedings. Iss 
The Malley Court recognized that the Harlow standard affords broad pro-
tection to police officers because they have immunity unless their mistake was 
objectively unreasonable. 159 The Court found that the standard appropriately 
balances the need to protect police officers for their objectively reasonable mis-
takes against the need to make them carefully evaluate their decision to get a 
warrant. 160 In interpreting the Harlow standard, a standard that it had de-
scribed as "objective," the Court peculiarly described the scope of protection in 
subjective terms, finding no immunity for "those who knowingly violate the 
law."I6I 
After determining the Harlow standard of qualified immunity provided ap-
sion of facts ditrers from plaintitr's version, and defendant alleges conduct that reasonable officer 
could have believed lawful). See supra notes 94-103 and infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text 
for discussions of the Court's concern with the problems presented by a fact-specific defense. 
154. In dictum, the Court stated that police officers have the same degree of immunity whether 
they seek arrest or search warrants. Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 n.6. 
155. ld. at 343-45. In determining whether police officers have absolute immunity, the Court 
considered the traditional two questions: whether at common law police officers would have had 
immunity for an unlawful arrest, and if so, whether Congress intended in enacting section 1983 to 
afford immunity. ld. at 339-40. The Court considered the officer's argument that his act in ob-
taining a warrant was similar to acts performed by complaining witnesses and by prosecutors, who, 
according to the officer, had absolute immunity at common law. Id. at 340-41. The Court noted, 
however, that at common law complaining witnesses did not have absolute immunity and that it 
should thus be reluctant to interpret section 1983 as supporting a claim for absolute immunity be-
cause the language of the statute did not provide for any immunity. Id. In addition, the Court 
stated that even though prosecutors have absolute immunity, police officers may assert only qualified 
immunity because the function of a police officer in obtaining a warrant is ditrerent from the function 
of a prosecutor in initiating criminal proceedings. Id. at 341-45. 
156. ld. at 343. 
157. 468 u.s. 897 (1984). 
158. Id. at 345-46 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23 & n.23). See infra notes 166-74 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of this case. The Harlow standard for qualified immunity in Malley 
furthered the goal of granting summary judgment when the claim is insubstantial because the factual 
question of what the officer knew may be resolved by examining the affidavit to the warrant. When 
officers make warrantless arrests, however, the factual issue of knowledge may prohibit the granting 
of summary judgment even when claims are "insubstantial." 
159. Malley, 475 U.S. at 343-45. 
160. ld. at 345-46. 
161. Id. at 341. 
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propriate protection, the Malley Court discussed its application. 162 It properly 
noted that summary judgment was possible in that context, thus effectuating the 
goal of Harlow to protect officials from frivolous suits. 163 It stated that the po-
lice officer had qualified immunity if his conduct was "objectively reason-
able."164 Even though the law was clearly established that police officers need 
probable cause to obtain a search warrant, the Court nevertheless determined 
that conduct unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment could 
be objectively reasonable for the purpose of granting qualified immunity. By 
adopting two standards of reasonableness, the Court extended the scope of im-
munity available under Harlow; officials would have immunity even if the gen-
eral principles of law were clearly established. It implicitly adopted Navarette's 
standard of reasonableness, which questioned whether officials should have 
known that their conduct was unconstitutional. 165 
The Court, however, never acknowledged that it had adopted two stan-
dards of reasonableness, nor that the fourth amendment law was clearly estab-
lished. In determining what constitutes objectively reasonable conduct, the 
Court found controlling its decision in United States v. Leon, 166 in which it ex-
plicitly adopted two standards of reasonableness in criminal proceedings. 167 
In Leon, the Court articulated two standards of reasonableness as it created 
a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,l 68 a judicially created remedy 
that prohibits the prosecution from introducing illegally seized evidence during 
a criminal proceeding. 169 The Leon Court stated that even if a search was un-
reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the evidence seized 
pursuant to an invalid warrant may be admitted if the police officer's seizure was 
''objectively reasonable." 170 In creating an objective good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule, the Court tied its application of the exclusionary rule to the 
application of the Harlow qualified immunity standard. The Court stated that 
an officer's reliance upon a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant must be "ob-
jectively reasonable," as defined by the Harlow standard. 171 In making this con-
162. /d. at 343-46. One commentator has agreed that the Court erred in failing to find that 
reliance on a magistrate's decision is per se objectively reasonable. Comment, supra note 47, at 258-
59. The commentator argued that the Malley decision implicitly requires police officers to have legal 
education because the Court determined that police officers could not rely on a magistrate's determi-
nation of probable cause. /d. Although the Court has recognized that the term "probable cause" 
cannot be "reduced to a neat set of legal rules," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983), it has 
nevertheless emphasized that nonlawyers can determine whether probable cause exists. See, e.g., 
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 352 (1972) (municipal clerk and grand juries able to 
determine whether probable cause exists). 
163. Malley, 475 U.S. at 340-41. 
164. /d. at 344-45. 
165. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Navarette reasonable-
ness standard. 
166. 468 U.S. 897 (1984), cited in Malley, 475 U.S. at 344. 
167. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-26. 
168. /d. 
169. Id. at 906. 
170. /d. at 922. 
171. /d. at 922 n.23. 
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nection, 172 the Leon Court stated that police officers must have a reasonable 
knowledge of the law. 173 The Court framed the question as "whether a reason-
ably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the 
magistrate's authorization." 174 
The Leon decision, which applied the Harlow standard for determining ob-
jectively reasonable conduct to the exclusionary rule, became the basis for the 
Court's decision in Malley. As in Leon, the Malley Court rejected the officer's 
argument that reliance upon a warrant is per se objectively reasonable. 17S It 
similarly proposed that the standard for qualified immunity considers how a 
"reasonably well trained officer" would have acted. 176 In contrast to Leon, how-
ever, the Court stated that officials would lose their defense of immunity if their 
reliance on the warrant application was "unreasonable," instead of "entirely 
unreasonable." 177 
172. Both the majority and the dissent discerned the linking of the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule with the Harlow standard for qualified immunity. See id. at 922·23 & n.23; id. at 
977 n.35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted that when the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable, a plaintiff whose fourth amendment rights have been 
violated will be unable to vindicate those rights under section 1983. Jd. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
173. Id. at 920-21 n.20. Some courts have attempted to describe the knowledge that police 
officers must have: 
Police officers can be expected to have a modicum of knowledge regarding the fundamental 
rights of citizens. Lawlessness will not be allowed to pervade our constabularies. How-
ever, in holding our law enforcement personnel to an objective standard of behavior, our 
judgment must be tempered with reason. If we are to measure official action against an 
objective standard, it must be a standard which speaks to what a reasonable officer should 
or should not know about the law he is enforcing and the methodology of effecting its 
enforcement. Certainly we cannot expect police officers to carry surveying equipment and 
a Decennial Digest on patrol; they cannot be held to a title-searcher's knowledge of metes 
and bounds or a legal scholar's expertise in constitutional law. 
Saldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982), cen. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983), quoted 
with approval in Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 774-75 (4th Cir. 1987). Although courts have 
recognized that police officers need not be experts in constitutional law, they have nevertheless rec· 
ognized that qualified immunity focuses attention on what a reasonable officer would have known. 
See, e.g., Walsh v. Franco, 849 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 781 F.2d 
24, 27 (2d Cir. 1987) ("'Officials are held to have constructive knowledge of established law'"); 
Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 957 (4th Cir. 1988) (police officer who falsely arrested person 
deemed to have known information that would have been reasonably discoverable by officer acting 
reasonably under the circumstances). 
174. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. 
175. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986). The Court also explained that police officers 
are responsible for their own actions and may not be freed from liability simply because the magis-
trate was incompetent. Id. at 344 n. 7, 345. 
176. Id. at 345. 
177. Id. In Leon, the Court stated that an officer does not act reasonably when "relying on a 
warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable.' " Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 
610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). 
In Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 721 (1st Cir. 1984), aff'd, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), the First 
Circuit court articulated a standard that afforded police officers limited immunity. /d. It held that 
"only where an officer is 'constitutionally negligent,' that is, where the officer should have known 
that the facts recited in the affidavit did not constitute probable cause, will liability attach." Id. 
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The Malley Court's interpretation of the Harlow standard was not surpris-
ing because the Leon Court had previously discussed the Harlow standard. Mal-
ley, like Leon, stated that reliance on a warrant must be objectively reasonable. 
In Anderson v. Creighton, 178 a warrantless search case, the Court's interpretation 
of the Harlow standard was not inextricably tied to its decisions in Leon and 
Ma/ley. 179 In determining that police officers could assert qualified immunity 
for a warrantless search of an individual's home, the Anderson Court expanded 
the scope of immunity by broadly interpreting Harlow's standard of objective 
reasonableness for fourth amendment claims. 180 The expansion occurred be-
cause of the Court's definition of "clearly established law," 181 its unwillingness 
to be controlled by the language of the fourth amendment,182 its explicit rejec-
tion of relating the scope of immunity to an official's discretion and responsibili-
ties,183 and its recognition that discovery at times may be necessary to resolve 
summary judgment motions asserting qualified immunity. 184 
In Anderson, the Court interpreted the Harlow standard which required 
courts to determine objective reasonableness by considering whether the rights 
asserted by the plaintiff were clearly established. 185 In recognizing that fourth 
amendment claims are often difficult to resolve, 186 the Court refused to hold 
police officers liable even if their actions violated a clearly established, abstract 
principle of fourth amendment law. 187 The Anderson Court noted that in the 
case before it the abstract law was clearly established, i.e., a warrantless search 
of an individual's home absent both probable cause and exigent circumstances 
violates the fourth amendment.188 It found that qualified immunity is not avail-
able as a defense only if a reasonable police officer would have known that the 
particular circumstances did not constitute both probable cause and exigent cir-
(emphasis in original). The court declared that reliance on a warrant is reasonable if the facts al-
leged in the affidavit supporting the warrant application "fall into the grey area appropriate for 
judicial determination." /d. (emphasis supplied). 
178. 107 s. Ct. 3034 (1987). 
179. See Malley, 415 U.S. at 345 (if reasonably well-trained officer would have known that 
affidavit failed to establish probable cause, and that officer should not have applied for warrant, 
immunity will not protect officer); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (where officer 
reasonably relied on warrant later found invalid, qualified immunity applied). See supra notes 166-
74 and accompanying text for a discussion of Leon. 
180. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3039-42. See infra notes 185-211 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Anderson. 
181. See Anderson, 101 S. Ct. at 3038-39. See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of this issue. 
182. See Anderson, 101 S. Ct. at 3041. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of this issue. 
183. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3040-41. See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of this issue. 
184. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3042 n.6. See infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of this issue. 
185. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3038-40. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of discovery. 
186. Anderson, 101 S. Ct. at 3041. 
187. /d. at 3039 n.2. 
188. /d. at 3039-40. 
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cumstances. 189 The Court stated the defense fails when the law makes it "ap-
parent" that the challenged conduct was unlawful. 190 The defense thus protects 
unlawful conduct, but not clearly unlawful conduct. 
In stating that officers may have qualified immunity even when they lack 
probable cause, the Court did not interpret the Harlow standard as did many of 
the lower federal courts. 191 The lower courts properly had noted that fourth 
amendment law clearly establishes that an arrest or a search requires probable 
cause. 192 Some courts also had correctly noted that the standards for probable 
cause and for immunity both question whether the officers' beliefs were reason-
able.193 They maintained that to ask twice the question whether the officers' 
beliefs were reasonable is to invite confusion. 194 
In applying the Harlow standard of objective reasonableness, the Anderson 
Court, however, did not perceive any confusion. It refused to be restrained by 
the language of the fourth amendment195 prohibiting unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The Court explicitly approved two standards of reasonableness for 
fourth amendment claims. Conduct "unreasonable" within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment, it reasoned, may nevertheless be "objectively reasonable" for 
the purpose of qualified immunity. 196 The Court approved these standards for 
two reasons. First, the Court deemed the use of the word "reasonable" in defin-
ing both standards to be only a matter of semantics, not substance; if the fourth 
amendment had prohibited "undue" searches and seizures, then there would not 
be two standards of reasonableness. 197 In addition, by combining all civil rights 
claims arising under the Constitution, the Court contended that the Harlow 
standard requires the Court to reasonably accommodate the interests of the indi-
189. /d. at 3~2. 
190. /d. at 3039. 
191. See, e.g., Mcintosh v. Arkansas Republican Party, 816 F.2d 409, 413 (8th Cir.) (no quali-
fied immunity where no probable cause), vacated, 825 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (remanded 
to district court in light of Anderson v. Creighton); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1569 (7th Cir. 
1985) (Harlow rule followed); Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 
1984) (reasonableness and probable cause direct qualified immunity); Clark v. Beville, 730 F.2d 739, . 
740 (11th Cir. 1984) (good faith actions yield qualified immunity); Trejo v. Perez, 693 F.2d 482, 488 
n.lO (5th Cir. 1982) (only reasonable ignorance precludes liability). But see Floyd v. Farrell, 765 
F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1985) (liability ensues only if there was "clearly" no probable cause); Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347-48 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(immunity if reasonable belief and good faith proved). 
192. See, eg., Mcintosh, 816 F.2d at 413 (that probable cause is necessary for arrest is clearly-
established fourth amendment law); Deary, 746 F.2d at 192 (if arrest lacks probable cause, it is in 
violation of clearly established law). 
193. See, e.g .• Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1569 (probable cause question depends on what officers 
reasonably believed; immunity question depends on whether officers reasonably believed they were 
acting reasonably). 
194. See, e.g., id (to instruct jury twice that officer-defendants would be exonerated if defend-
ants had reasonable beliefs would confuse jury). 
195. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3041 ("regardless of the terminology used, the precise content 
of most of the Constitution's civil-liberties guarantees rests upon an assessment of what accommoda-
tion between governmental need and individual freedom is reasonable"). 
196. /d. 
197. /d. 
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vidual and the government, regardless of the language of the amendment form-
ing the basis of the civil rights claim. 198 The Court, therefore, determined that a 
finding of liability under the fourth amendment did not preclude inquiry as to 
whether the challenged conduct was nevertheless objectively reasonable. 199 
The Anderson Court's reasons, however, are unpersuasive. Its facile substi-
tution of the word "undue" for the word "unreasonable" is unconvincing. By 
assuming that the word "undue" is a synonym for "reasonable," the Court con-
cluded that there are not two different standards emerging from its interpreta-
tion of the word "unreasonable." Yet, even if the word "undue" is a synonym, 
courts nevertheless would face the equally impossible task of trying to split "se-
mantic hairs"; they would have to try to distinguish between "undue" searches 
and seizures under the fourth amendment and objectively "unreasonable" 
searches and seizures for the purpose of qualified immunity. In other words, 
there would appear to remain, in effect, two virtually indistinguishable standards 
of reasonableness. Even more flawed is the Court's gross generalization that the 
word "reasonable" is linked to most constitutional rights because the rights rep-
resent a "[reasonable] accommodation between governmental need and individ-
ual freedom."200 This type of generalization severely undermines the Court's 
tradition of carefully defining and distinguishing the standards for liability under 
various amendments. 2o1 
The Anderson Court also expanded the scope of liability by explicitly find-
ing that the Harlow standard applies to all officials acting with discretion, re-
gardless of the scope of their discretion and responsibilities. 202 The Court found 
that tailoring immunity to the scope of an official's duties would not provide the 
umbrella of security needed for an official to act decisively.203 
In broadly defining the Harlow standard, the Court, however, found it nec-
essary to modify its previous interpretation of Harlow.204 Although it stated 
that the resolution of insubstantial claims prior to discovery was the "driving 
force behind Harlow's substantial reformation of qualified-immunity princi-
198. /d. 
199. /d. 
200. Id. at 3041. 
201. For example, the Court has recognized that officials violate the eighth amendment if they 
use wanton and unnecessary force during a prison riot and if they are deliberately indifferent to a 
prisoner's medical needs. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (no eighth amendment 
violation where prison officials did not use wanton and unnecessary force to quell prison riot); Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-08 (1976) (no eighth amendment violation where physician's conduct 
did not amount to deliberate indifference to prisoner's medical needs). The Court's broad statement 
in Anderson suggests that officials who violate these more stringent standards might be able to assert 
qualified immunity as a defense if the Court were to erroneously interpret the eighth amendment as 
representing a "reasonable" accommodation of interests. Immunity under these circumstances is 
improper. 
202. 107 S. Ct. at 3040-41. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, however, only the concurrence advocated 
applying the standard across the board to all officials. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
203. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3040-41. 
204. Id. at 3038-41. See supra note 33 for a discussion of the Court's modification of the 
Harlow standard. 
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ples,"20s the Court determined that the Harlow standard at times requires courts 
to grant discovery. 206 Under the modified Harlow standard, discovery was pos-
sible because the Anderson Court had added the fact-specific prong of Nava-
rette-whether police officers should have known that their conduct, in light of 
the particular circumstances confronting them, constituted a fourth amendment 
violation. 207 By refusing to impose liability upon officials if their conduct vio-
lated only abstract fourth amendment law, the Anderson Court reasoned that 
discovery becomes necessary to resolve the issue of qualified immunity.208 This 
was a new step for the Court.209 Even in Malley, where the Court considered 
specific circumstances and not just abstract law, the Court could easily ascertain 
the facts without permitting discovery by reading the affidavit accompanying the 
warrant application.21o 
In applying the Harlow standard to a warrantless search, the Anderson 
Court thus greatly expanded the scope of immunity available to police officers. 
It made clear that the Harlow standard applies to police officers' actions and that 
objective reasonableness must be measured in terms of a reasonable officer's 
knowledge of the "contours" of clearly established rights, not a reasonable of-
205. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3039 n.2. 
206. /d. at 3042 n.6. The Court found that discovery would be necessary in this case if the 
actions alleged by the police officer were actions that a reasonable officer could have believed to be 
lawful, and these actions differed from the actions alleged by the plaintiff. /d. See supra notes 85-90 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's concern with resolution of the qualified immu-
nity issue prior to discovery. 
207. /d. at 3040; see also Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1988) (after 
Anderson, court must consider two issues: generality of relevant rule of law and clarity of rule's 
application to alleged facts). See supra note 79 and accompanying text for a listing of the three issues 
in Navarette. 
208. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3042 n.6. 
209. In Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988), a decision not referring to the Anderson 
opinion, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the Harlow standard as barring the fact-specific inquiry of 
what officials knew when they acted. /d. at 1267 & n.8. The court stated that such an inquiry would 
require discovery, which the Harlow standard prohibits. /d. 
210. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 338 (1986). Most states have adopted rules similar to Rule 
4l(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, FED. R. CRIM. P. 4l(c), which requires that oral 
testimony in support of an affidavit be recorded. See, e.g., State v. Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762, 767 (W. 
Va. 1986) (W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 4l(c) is "substantially identical" to federal Rule 4l(c)); Note, The 
Constitutionality of the Use of Unrecorded Oral Testimony to Establish Probable Cause for Search 
Warrants, 70 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1605 n.l2 (1984) (citing cases holding that otherwise insufficient 
warrant application cannot be supplemented by unrecorded oral testimony). Courts have recognized 
that requiring the contemporaneous recording of oral testimony promotes judicial efficiency because 
courts may then easily ascertain what the officer knew when executing the warrant. Adkins, 346 
S.E.2d at 767. Courts have also recognized that such a rule protects constitutional rights, stating 
that "[t]he probable cause requirement would be significantly weakened if a court can rely on the 
recollection of those concerned to support a probable cause finding long after the search warrant has 
been issued." United States v. Hittle, 575 F.2d 799, 802 (lOth Cir. 1978). Some courts, however, 
have failed to recognize the benefits of the rule; they have allowed the officer who sought the warrant 
and the magistrate who issued it to testify at a suppression hearing as to what the officer said in 
support of the application for a warrant. See, e.g., Fowler v. State, 128 Ga. App. 501, 503, 197 
S.E.2d 502, 503 (information supporting finding of probable cause may be presented to magistrate by 
means of oral testimony), cen. denied, 414 U.S. 1000 (1973); Note, supra, at 1607 n.22 (citing cases 
holding that oral warrant testimony need not be recorded. 
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fleer's knowledge of clearly established rights. The Court, however, did not pro-
vide any analytical tools for determining what constitutes the "contours" of a 
constitutional right. It reiterated that liability attaches to actions that were ap-
parently unlawfuJ.2 11 Nevertheless, the Court's unwillingness to be restrained 
by the language of the fourth amendment and its acceptance of two standards of 
reasonableness do not resolve the issue of whether qualified immunity is avail-
able to other fourth amendment claims. 
Ill. APPLYING THE HARLOW STANDARD FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TO 
EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS ARISING FROM AN ARREST 
When subject to force during an arrest, plaintiffs in actions arising under 
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act212 have alleged violations of both the 
fourth213 and fourteenth amendments.214 Courts have disagreed about whether 
qualified immunity is available as a defense to these claims.215 The United 
States Supreme Court's decisions in Anderson v. Creighton 216 and Malley v. 
Briggs 217 provide the framework for analyzing whether officials have qualified 
immunity when they use excessive force during an arrest. 
As discussed in the previous section, in both Anderson and Malley, the 
Court recognized two standards of reasonableness, one relating to the fourth 
amendment claim, the other relating to the issue of qualified immunity under 
section 1983.218 Determining whether conduct was objectively reasonable for 
the purpose of immunity requires consideration of the clarity of the law; objec-
tive reasonableness is to be "measured by reference to clearly established 
law."219 After Anderson, this determination involves consideration not only of 
the general law but also of the "contours" of the asserted right, which must be 
"sufficiently clear" to notify officials of unlawful conduct. 220 Although it is un-
clear how to ascertain the contours of a right, courts generally have studied 
decisions by the United States Supreme Court and circuit courts in determining 
the clarity of the law. 221 In addition, because the Harlow standard was designed 
to afford officials a pretrial resolution of the issue, 222 courts must also consider 
211. 107 S. Ct. at 3039. 
212. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982). 
213. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. See infra notes 237-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
this issue. 
214. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ I. See infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of this issue. 
215. See supra note 8 for a discussion of this issue. 
216. 107 S. Ct. 3034 ( 1987); see supra notes 178-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Anderson. 
217. 475 U.S. 335 (1986); see supra notes 154-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Malley. 
218. See supra notes 196-99 for the discussion of the Court's recognition of two standards of 
reasonableness. 
219. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
220. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3039. 
221. See supra note 136 for a discussion of this issue. 
222. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. 
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the procedural and substantive aspects of the defense when determining whether 
officials have qualified immunity. 
Application of the Harlow standard to excessive force claims under the 
fourth and fourteenth amendments indicates that qualified immunity is not 
available as a defense. It is not a defense to a violation of the substantive due 
process component of the fourteenth amendment because under that amend-
ment conduct is actionable only if egregious. 223 Because the immunity defense 
applies only to objectively reasonable conduct, it does not shelter conduct that is 
egregious; such conduct signifies a greater degree of culpability and it is per se 
objectively unreasonable. 
Nor is qualified immunity a defense to a fourth amendment excessive force 
claim. 224 It is an unnecessary defense because the fourth amendment standard 
for liability and the standard for qualified immunity overlap. Both standards 
raise the same issue-whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the 
force used was necessary.22' Resolving the issue of fourth amendment liability 
automatically resolves the issue of qualified immunity. 
A. The General Standard of Liability for the Use of Force During an Arrest: 
Claims Based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
Decisions by the United States Supreme Court226 and the lower courts227 
concerning excessive force claims under the fourth and fourteenth amendments 
indicate that the general standard for liability under these amendments is well 
established: The fourteenth amendment prohibits egregious conduct, 228 and the 
fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable conduct. 229 
223. See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1030 (2d Cir.) (permitting action against prison 
guard for unprovoked attack), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 1033 (1973). See infra notes 230-36, 254-
59 and accompanying text for a discussion of substantive due process. 
224. See, e.g., Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1988) (no qualified immunity for 
police officer who in March 1985 fatally shot fleeing felon because Sixth Circuit in 1983 had declared 
use of such force unconstitutional). But see Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 371-75 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(qualified immunity for police officer who in May 1983 shot fleeing felon because state court had not 
declared that state statute, which authorized use of deadly force, to be unconstitutional). See also 
supra note 8 for a review of the different courts of appeals decisions regarding the availability of the 
qualified immunity defense in fourth amendment excessive force claims. 
225. See infra notes 240-53, 262-353 and accompanying text. 
226. 'See infra notes 231, 240-44 and accompanying text. 
227. See infra notes 232-36, 246-52 and accompanying text. 
228. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S 165, 172 (1952) (illegally breaking into accused's 
bedroom, forcibly attempting to remove capsules which accused had swallowed, and directing physi-
cian to induce vomiting was conduct prohibited by fourteenth amendment). See infra notes 230-36 
and accompanying text for a discussion of substantive due process protection under the fourteenth 
amendment. 
229. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. I, 7 (1988) (apprehension by use of deadly force is 
seizure subject to reasonableness requirement of fourth amendment). See infra notes 237-53 and 
accompanying text for the fourth amendment standard. Plaintiffs, however, may not recover twice 
for an injury incurred during an arrest. See generally Memphis Community School Dist. v. 
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-10 (1986) (trial court improperly allowed jury to assess duplicative 
damages by instructing them to consider inherent value of constitutional right in addition to consid-
ering actual losses); Carter v. Rogers, 805 F.2d 1153, 1157 (4th Cir. 1986) (only one recovery for act 
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1. Fourteenth Amendment Claims 
In examining claims that the use of force during an arrest violated the four-
teenth amendment, courts have considered whether the alleged conduct violated 
a plaintiff's right to substantive due process.230 To define the standard of liabil-
ity, courts generally have relied on two decisions, the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Rochin v. California 231 and Judge Friendly's decision for the 
Second Circuit in Johnson v. Glick. 232 In Rochin, the Supreme Court stated that 
conduct that "shocks the conscience" violates the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 233 Recognizing the difficulty of determining when conduct 
is egregious under this standard, Judge Friendly, in Johnson v. Glick, articulated 
the following four factors to aid courts in examining substantive due process 
claims based on the alleged use of excessive force: 
[1] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship between 
the need and the amount of force that was used, [3] the extent of injury 
inflicted, and (4] whether force was applied in a good faith effort to 
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the 
very purpose of causing harm. 234 
Most courts have used these factors in determining whether plaintiffs have al-
leged substantive due process claims;235 they have not, however, always required 
plaintiffs to prove that officials acted maliciously.236 
Although courts have not uniformly applied the Glick factors, they have 
forming bases of state assault and battery claim and federal excessive force claim); Fowler v. Carroll-
ton Pub. Library, 799 F.2d 976, 982 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[b]ecause § 1983 damages are based on a 
principle of compensation, a characterization of plaintiff's Joss which permits duplicative recovery 
for one type of harm is not allowed"). Plaintiffs should base their claim upon the fourth amendment, 
not the fourteenth amendment, since the fourth amendment standard of liability is less stringent 
than the fourteenth amendment standard of liability. See infra notes 230-53 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of this point. 
230. See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text. 
231. 342 u.s. 165 (1952). 
232. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). 
233. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
234. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033. 
235. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1216 (1st Cir. 1986) (FBI agent violated 
hostage's rights under Glick analysis when he "[g)unned down ... innocent hostage without reason 
or provocation"); Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1163 (5th Cir. 1986) (failure to use Glick analy-
sis resulted in improper blending of simple negligence and claimed deprivation of constitutional 
rights); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500-01 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (use of Glick 
factors proper in addressing substantive due process claim of plaintiffs who were beaten and shot by 
police), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 582-83, 586 (6th Cir. 
1985) (en bane) (Glick factors to be considered where officer's weapon accidently discharged, injur-
ing plaintiff who was being handcuffed); see generally Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 383 & n.4 (4th 
Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Glick factors are relevant to all excessive force claims, whether based on fourth, 
eighth, or fourteenth amendment). 
236. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 n.l (2d Cir. 1988) (plaintiff need not prove 
malice to establish constitutional tort); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir. 
1986) (officials liable if force was unreasonable, unnecessary, or violent or they should have known 
that force was excessive), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1384 (1987); Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 
1163 (5th Cir. 1986) (although malice is a factor, gross negligence is actionable). But see Martin v. 
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recognized that the factors indicate whether the alleged conduct was egregious. 
Thus, the fourteenth amendment standard is a clearly established general princi-
ple of law. 
2. Fourth Amendment Claims 
Courts also have considered whether the use of force during an arrest vio-
lated the fourth amendment.237 In attempting to define what constitutes an un-
reasonable seizure under that amendment most courts have relied on the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Gamer ;238 some courts also 
have relied on the four factors set out in Judge Friendly's opinion in Johnson v. 
Glick.239 
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court recognized that the fourth 
amendment prohibits "unreasonable" seizures by officials. 240 The Court stated 
that officials "seize" a person within the meaning of the fourth amendment 
whenever they restrain that person's ability to walk away.241 To determine the 
constitutionality of a seizure, the Court asserted, a court must consider the total-
ity of the circumstances242 when balancing "'the nature and quality of the in-
Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 261 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("intent to inllict hann" is one element of substan-
tive due process claim). 
The Supreme Court has stated that negligent conduct does not violate substantive due process. 
See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986) (negligence does not work deprivation within 
meaning of Due Process Clause). It has specifically left open the question of whether gross negli-
gence or recklessness violates substantive due process. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 
n.3 (1986) ("this case affords us no occasion to consider whether something less than intentional 
negligence such as recklessness or 'gross negligence' is enough to trigger the protection of the Due 
Process Clause"). Some courts have erroneously interpreted the Court's decisions in Davidson and 
Daniels as stating that only intentional conduct violates substantive due process. See, e.g., Wilson v. 
Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir. 1988) ("constitutional tortfeasor must have acted intentionally 
because negligence is not actionable under§ 1983"). The Supreme Court recently granted review to 
determine whether malice, the fourth Glick factor, is a necessary element of excessive force claims 
based on the fourteenth and fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Graham v. Con-
nor, 57 U.S.L.W. 3270 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1988). 
237. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. l, 7 (1985) (use of deadly force in apprehension of 
suspect is seizure for purpose of fourth amendment). See infra notes 240-53 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the fourth amendment standard. 
238. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). See, e.g., Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (5th Cir. 
1985) (Tennessee v. Gamer establishes fourth amendment standard for use of deadly force by police 
officer). See infra notes 240-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gamer. 
239. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). See, e.g., Graham v. City of 
Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945, 948 (4th Cir. 1987) (in excessive force claim, need to show force applied 
maliciously and sadistically for purpose of causing harm), cen. granted sub nom. Graham v. Conner, 
109 S. Ct. 54 (1988); Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1371 (8th Cir. 1985) (Glick factors to be 
used to determine if excessive force used in arrest). See infra notes 240-53 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the fourth amendment standard. 
240. Gamer, 471 U.S. at 7. 
241. /d.; see also Michigan v. Chestemut, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979 (1988) (person is seized" 'only 
if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave'") (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 
(1980)). 
242. Gamer, 471 U.S at 8-9. 
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trusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance 
of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' " 243 In examining 
whether officers may use deadly force to seize a fleeing suspect, the Court held 
that the fourth amendment permitted the use of deadly force as a reasonable 
response if the suspect threatened the officers with a weapon or if the officers had 
"probable cause to believe that [the suspect had] committed a crime involving 
the infliction of serious physical harm."244 
The Gamer decision thus clearly established the general legal principle that 
the use of unreasonable force by officials violates the fourth amendment.24s In 
addressing excessive force claims based on the fourth amendment, many courts 
have quoted the language used by the Court in Garner 246 or have specified fac-
tors to be considered in balancing the interests of the parties. 247 These courts 
have interpreted the Gamer standard as questioning whether the officers' con-
duct was objectively reasonable. 248 
Courts, however, have disagreed as to whether they should apply the fac-
tors specified in Johnson v. Glick, a decision discussing a violation of substantive 
due process, to claims based on the fourth amendment. 249 The Fifth Circuit and 
243. /d. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). 
244. Id. at 11-12. 
245. /d. at 7. The Supreme Court described the fourth amendment standard of liability for the 
use of deadly force to seize a fleeing suspect, a standard not violated if an officer using deadly force 
reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary. /d. at 11-12. The Court, however, did not con-
sider whether the lower court was correct in determining that the officer who shot the suspect had 
qualified immunity because he reasonably relied on the state statute, which authorized the use of 
deadly force. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 242-43 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, Tennes-
see v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). In Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, the officer testified that he had 
been taught that state law authorized the use of deadly force under the circumstances presented to 
him. /d. at 241. The court's decision specifically addressed the constitutionality of the state statute, 
not whether the officer had reasonably relied on the statute. /d. at 246-47. 
246. See, e.g., Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Garner, 471 
U.S. at 7-9). 
247. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (balancing 
requires the court to consider " 'the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is 
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted' ") (quoting Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)), cen. denied, 476 U.S. 115 (1986). 
248. See, e.g., Heath v. Henning, 854 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1988) (in Garner analysis, primary 
focus is on objective reasonableness of officer's actions); Lester, 830 F.2d at 711 ("Fourth Amend-
ment test measures a seizure's objective reasonableness under the circumstances."). For a decision 
not relying on Garner, but applying an objectively reasonable standard, see Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 
1501 (affirming district court's finding that police officer's belief his life was in danger was not objec-
tively reasonable and could not justify killing). 
249. Compare Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 1987) (malice instruction 
constitutes reversible error) with Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1985) (malice 
inquiry is proper under the fourth amendment). See infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text for 
the varying interpretations of the fourth amendment standard. Even courts within the same circuit 
characterize the relationship between Garner and Glick differently. Compare Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 
F.2d 1205, 1209-12 (5th Cir. 1985) (both standards balance same interests) with Hinojosa v. City of 
Terrell, 834 F.2d 1223, 1229 n.7 (5th Cir. 1988) (Garner standard is "slightly different standard" 
than that in Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981), which is similar to Glick 
standard). 
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one panel of the Fourth Circuit have determined that all of the Glick factors, 
including whether officials acted maliciously, aid courts in determining what 
constitutes "reasonable" conduct within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. 250 A different panel of the Fourth Circuit and the Courts of Appeals of 
the Second, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have determined that the 
application of the Glick factors to fourth amendment claims is improper because 
the Gamer standard requires courts to determine officials' objective good faith 
and the final Glick factor requires courts to determine officials' subjective good 
faith. 251 The Eighth Circuit has combined the Garner and Glick standards, 
holding that officials are liable if they acted unreasonably or if they used force 
for an improper purpose. zsz 
Although courts disagree as to how to interpret the Garner decision, the 
Supreme Court in that case, as it had in Rochin v. California, clearly established 
a general principle of law: liability attaches when officials use unreasonable 
force. Even though the general standards of liability for fourth and fourteenth 
amendment claims are clearly established, officials may be immune if the "con-
tours" of these rights fail to give officials notice that their use of force was un-
lawful. 253 Whether qualified immunity is available as a defense also requires 
250. For the Fifth Circuit's position, see, e.g., Jamieson, 772 F.2d at 1210 (quoting Shillingford 
v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981)). Another panel of the Fifth Circuit has determined 
that the Gamer decision is applicable only in determining the liability of municipalities for fourth 
amendment violations, not the liability of officers. Hendrix v. Matlock, 782 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th 
Cir. 1986). For the decision by a Fourth Circuit panel, see Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 
945, 948 (4th Cir. 1987), cen. granted sub nom. Graham v. Conner, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 3, 
1988) (No. 87-6571). 
251. For the decision by a panel of the Fourth Circuit, see Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 
(4th Cir. 1988) (Glick analysis rejected, reasonableness under fourth amendment is wholly objective 
standard as in Gamer). For the decision by the Second Circuit, see Heath v. Henning, 854 F.2d 6, 9 
(2d Cir. 1988) (jury instructions based on Glick standards rejected as Gamer standards focus on 
objective reasonableness of officer's actions consistent with fourth amendment analysis). For the 
decision by the Seventh Circuit, see Lester, 830 F.2d at 712-14 (subjective inquiry to determine if 
officer acted with malice incompatible with fourth amendment "objectively reasonable" analysis). 
See also Freyermuth, Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987 DuKE L.J. 692, 699 (1987) (malice is not 
factor in determining whether force was unreasonable). But see Jones v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 
844 F.2d 500, 504 (8th Cir. 1988) (malice instruction does not constitute plain error when plaintiff 
alleged substantive due process claim arising from force during arrest). For a decision by the Dis-
trict .of Columbia Circuit, see Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 261 n. 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Glick 
standard rejected in favor of Gamer standard where more specific constitutional command protects 
interest). 
252. Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1371 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing Bauer v. Norris, 713 F.2d 
408, 411-12 (8th Cir. 1983)). 
253. This latter inquiry could also be stated in terms similar to the issue presented in Malley v. 
Briggs-whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the use of force was un-
lawful. Some courts have paraphrased other portions of the Malley decision in framing the inquiry. 
See, e.g., Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 775 n.2 (4th Cir. 1987) (qualified immunity available to 
officer if legal norm allegedly violated not "clearly established as to particular actions taken at time 
he acted"); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987) (qualified immunity available if "it was 
objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed or . . . [if] officers of 
reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met"). 
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courts to consider the relationship between the standards of liability and the 
Harlow standard for qualified immunity. 
B. The Contours of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to be Free 
from Excessive Force: The Relationship Between the Standards of 
Liability and the Harlow Standard for Qualified Immunity 
1. Fourteenth Amendment Claims: Distinct Standards 
Although excessive force claims are fact-specific, generally 
requiring courts to consider the totality of the circumstances, the contours 
of the fourteenth amendment right are nonetheless sufficiently clear to apprise 
officials of which actions violate a person's right to substantive due process. 
Even courts that grant immunity, unless there was close factual correspondence 
between case law and the officials' challenged actions, recognize that close corre-
spondence is not necessary when official conduct is egregious.254 In other 
words, reasonable officials know that the law clearly prohibits egregious uncon-
stitutional conduct. 
Although the availability of qualified immunity usually requires two inquir-
ies-a determination of the general standard of liability and a determination of 
the contours of the asserted right-these inquiries merge when plaintiffs raise 
substantive due process claims. Even though conflicts among the circuit courts 
of appeal regarding the scope of a constitutional right are generally relevant in 
arguing that a right is not clearly established, 255 such conflicts do not support an 
officer's assertion of qualified immunity for fourteenth amendment substantive 
due process claims because conduct that violates any of the fourteenth amend-
ment standards is not effectively reasonable for the purpose of qualified immu-
nity.256 For example, when courts apply all four Glick factors to substantive 
due process claims, qualified immunity is not available because the final factor, 
malice, is inconsistent with the Harlow standard, which bars immunity if offi-
cials should have known that their conduct was unconstitutional. 257 Even 
254. See, e.g., Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 n.l8 (7th Cir.) (there may be situations in 
which actions are so egregious that results of balancing test will be foregone conclusion), cert. de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 172 (1986); see also supra note 135. 
255. See Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 (lOth Cir. 1987) (conflict among circuit courts of 
appeal relevant but not controlling to Harlow inquiry), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988). See 
supra note 137 for a discussion of the relevance of circuit court decisions. 
256. See generally Wood v. Sunn, 865 F.2d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding of deliberate indif-
ference under eighth amendment bars finding that official's conduct was objectively reasonable for 
purpose of immunity). 
257. See, e.g., Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1164 (5th Cir. 1986) (qualified immunity is 
not available for malicious conduct); see generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 821 (1982) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (officials who knew their conduct was unconstitutional do not have immu-
nity even if reasonable officers would not have known that conduct was unlawful). But see Bailey v. 
Turner, 736 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1984). In Bailey v. Turner, the Fourth Circuit upheld the jury's 
inconsistent findings under the eighth amendment. Id. at 965-66. In evaluating a prison official's use 
of mace to control a prisoner, the jury found liability under the eighth amendment using four Glick 
factors and nevertheless found qualified immunity. Id at 965-66, 970 n.8. Such an inconsistent 
finding can only be reconciled by noting that the court used the Glick factors to determine what was 
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courts that apply only the first three factors-the amount of force, the relation-
ship between the amount of force and the need for the force, and the extent of 
the injury-often use these three factors to create an inference of malice, 2' 8 also 
negating officials' claims that their conduct was objectively reasonable. Finally, 
qualified immunity is not available even when courts do not require plaintiffs to 
prove malice because the general standard of liability for substantive due process 
claims requires egregious conduct, conduct that is clearly not objectively reason-
able for the purpose of qualified immunity. 
A fourteenth amendment violation indicates that officials had notice that 
their actions were unlawful, 259 that there was no legitimate question regarding 
the propriety of their actions, and that reasonably well-trained officers would 
have known that the actions were unreasonable. The fourteenth amendment 
standard for liability is different from and more stringent than the objective rea-
sonableness standard for qualified immunity. Therefore, qualified immunity is 
never a defense available to a fourteenth amendment excessive force claim. 
2. Fourth Amendment Claims: Overlapping Standards 
To determine the contours of the fourth amendment right to be free from 
excessive force requires consideration of Tennessee v. Garner 2ro and the signifi-
cance of conflicting interpretations of that case. Garner indicates the contours of 
the fourth amendment by defining the fourth amendment's general standard of 
reasonableness as encompassing the issue of whether a reasonable officer would 
have believed that the use of force was necessary. The intercircuit conflict con-
cerning the fourth amendment interpretation, however, does not support the 
finding that the contours of the fourth amendment are too ambiguous to put 
police officers on notice that the use of unreasonable force violates the fourth 
amendment. The contours of the fourth amendment right are clear; courts have 
either imposed upon the fourth amendment the more stringent fourteenth 
amendment standard or they have interpreted the fourth amendment as ques-
tioning whether conduct was objectively reasonable. Qualified immunity would 
not be a defense when courts erroneously consider under the fourth amendment 
whether the conduct was malicious because malicious conduct is per se objec-
tively unreasonable for the purpose of qualified immunity.261 Qualified immu-
"reasonable under the circumstances," id. at 965, and that the jury may have inferred that the official 
"reasonably" relied on a state statute that authorized the use of mace against prisoners. I d. at 970 
n.9. 
258. See, e.g., Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655 n.7 (lOth Cir. 1987) (malice or sadism ele-
ment redundant because when amount of force used caused injuries so severe and was so dispropor-
tionate to need presented that conscience was shocked, malice or sadism should be presumed), cert. 
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988). 
259. See generally Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 n.l8 (7th Cir.) (when constitutional 
right requires court to balance interests of plaintiff and state, liability may nevertheless attach, "even 
though prior case law may not address the specific facts at issue," when official's "actions are so 
egregious that the result of the balancing will be a foregone conclusion") (emphasis supplied), cert. 
denied, 107 S. Ct. 172 (1986). 
260. 471 U.S. I (1985). 
261. See, e.g., Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1210 (5th Cir. 1985) (Glick factors, which 
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nity is an unnecessary defense when courts properly interpret the Garner 
standard as questioning whether the use of force was objectively unreasonable 
because the standards are the same for finding a fourth amendment violation 
and for deciding immunity. In addition, the courts' discussion of excessive force 
claims reveals the unusual nature of these claims. Because they are fact-specific, 
requiring discovery and the fact finder to determine the credibility of the parties, 
the procedural safeguards created by the Harlow standard are impossible to 
apply. 
a. The Contours of the Fourth Amendment Right 
The Garner Court questioned whether the use of deadly force was objec-
tively reasonable. Although the Garner opinion did not refer to the Glick factors 
in describing how to determine the constitutionality of a seizure, it set forth a 
standard that included three of the Glick factors: the amount of force used, the 
relationship between the amount of force and the need for force, and the extent 
of the injury.262 The Court asserted that it "must balance the nature and quality 
of the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment interests against the im-
portance of the government's interests alleged to justify the intrusion."263 In 
examining the use of deadly force to stop a fleeing suspect, the Garner Court 
evaluated the need for the force in considering the government's interest in law 
enforcement, and it examined the extent of the injury in assessing the intrusive-
ness of a seizure. 264 
In weighing the extent of the intrusion against the government's need to 
stop a suspect with deadly force, the Court focused on an officer's justification 
for the use of deadly force. The Court did not hold that deadly force is never 
necessary, but rather confined its inquiry to the reason for the use of deadly 
force as it balanced the suspect's interests against the interests of the govern-
ment. The Court's standard does not require the plaintiffs to prove that police 
officers acted maliciously, the fourth Glick factor. The motive of the officer is 
question whether use of force was malicious, express test "similar" to Gamer standard). Whether 
the Ninth Circuit also considers malice in determining whether force was unreasonable is unclear. 
In White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1986), the court did not mention the Gamer 
decision as it detailed the following factors for determining whether the use of force during an arrest 
violated the fourth amendment: "the officer's safety, the motivation for the arrest, and the extent of 
the injury." /d. at 816. The court's reference to the officer's motivation is ambiguous because this 
factor could question whether the arrest was malicious or whether the force used by the officer was 
in response to seriousness of the alleged crime. See also Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 
1416 (5th Cir.) (uses same factors to interpret Gamer's reasonableness standard), cert. denied, 108 S. 
Ct. 311 (1987). 
262. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985). In Gamer, the Court frequently refers to 
"the extent of the intrusion" and the intrusiveness of the seizure. /d. at 7-11. In Lester v. City of 
Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit stated, however, that the extent of a 
plaintiff's injuries was not a factor in determining whether the use of force during an arrest violated 
the fourth amendment. /d. at 712. Accord Freyermuth, supra note 251, at 699. The Seventh Circuit 
did state that it was a factor in determining the amount of damages. /d. 
263. Gamer, 471 U.S. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S 696, 703 (1983)). 
264. /d. at 8-12. 
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not a factor because the fourth amendment inquiry is generally objective. 265 
The Garner Court thus interpreted the fourth amendment standard of rea-
sonableness as questioning whether a reasonable officer under the circumstances 
would have believed that deadly force was necessary. Unless a fleeing felon 
presents a risk of harm to police officers or others, an officer's belief that deadly 
force is necessary is per se unreasonable. The Garner decision also implicitly 
defines the contours of fourth amendment claims regarding the use of excessive 
nondeadly force; the use of nondeadly force to effect or maintain an arrest is 
reasonable if a reasonable officer would have believed that the use of such force 
was necessary. 266 This inquiry requires courts to consider the same factors: the 
amount of force, the relationship between the amount of force and the need for 
the force, and the extent of the injury. The fact that the force in question is 
nondeadly does not change the standard; it only affects how courts weigh the 
three factors. This application of Garner thus comports with the Court's fourth 
amendment balancing approach. 
The Garner decision also suggests that the fourth amendment standard of 
liability does not question merely whether a police officer used unnecessary 
force; it also questions whether a reasonable police officer would have believed 
that the force used was necessary. Police officers are not liable under the fourth 
amendment for "every push and shove they make. "267 The standard affords 
them discretion to act decisively. In balancing the interests of the parties under 
265. See, e.g., Lester, 830 F.2d at 712 (objectively reasonable seizure does not violate fourth 
amendment despite the officer's bad intent); accord Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 868-69 (4th Cir. 
1988) (fourth amendment reasonableness standard is wholly objective); see also O'Neil v. Krzemin-
ski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 n.l (2d Cir. 1988) (amendment forming basis of claim not specified, but malice 
not a necessary element to establish that force used dUring arrest was unconstitutional); see generally 
Turner v. Dammon, 848 F.2d 440, 444-47 (4th Cir. 1988) (objective fourth amendment standard 
applies to claim that police officers harassed business owners with unnecessary administrative 
searches). 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the fourth amendment provides an objective standard 
when considering the constitutionality of searches. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 
138 (1978) (in examining searches, courts have applied a standard of objective reasonableness with-
out regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved). Even when courts are 
confronted with claims that stops by police officers were a pretext, they have nevertheless examined 
the constitutionality of the stops in objective terms. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 
708 (11th Cir. 1986) (issue is whether under the circumstances "a reasonable officer would have 
made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation") (emphasis in original). 
The Supreme Court has also applied an objective standard when criminal defendants assert that 
police officers either lied or were reckless in detailing the facts supporting their warrant applications. 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). The Court stated that the defendants would be 
entitled to a hearing if, after the challenged statements were excluded, the remaining facts were 
insufficient to support the warrant. Id. at 171-72. 
266. Courts have applied the Gamer standard to excessive force claims arising from the use of 
nondeadly force. See, e.g., Lester, 830 F.2d at 710-12 (court rejects "shocks the conscience" stan-
dard and applies objective fourth amendment analysis). 
267. Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir. 1988). Decisions by courts that have deter-
mined that the negligent use of excessive force does not violate the fourth amendment also indicate 
that the standard of liability demands more than that the force was unnecessary. See, e.g., Dodd v. 
City of Norwich, 827 F.2d l, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1987) (seizures conducted in negligent manner not unrea-
sonable unless officer's conduct intentional), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 701 (1988). 
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the fourth amendment, courts recognize the need for such discretion when they 
consider the state's interest in law enforcement. 268 
The Garner standard thus duplicates the Harlow standard of objective rea-
sonableness. Both standards are fact-specific and question whether a reasonable 
officer would have believed that the force used was necessary.269 Nevertheless, 
the fourth amendment standard for liability and the qualified immunity standard 
could be distinguished if Garner and Anderson were interpreted as supporting 
two standards of reasonableness regarding fourth amendment claims of exces-
sive force during an arrest. This interpretation is based on the Court's reference 
to "probable cause" in Garner: 
Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is 
not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly 
force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there 
is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving 
the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly 
force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, 
some warning has been given. 270 
The Court's reference to probable cause is ambiguous. It could refer either to 
the fourth amendment standard of probable cause or to the less stringent stan-
dard of objective good faith recognized in Ma/ley 271 and Anderson.272 If the 
"probable cause" language were interpreted as denoting the fourth amendment 
standard of probable cause, then the standard for immunity would be different. 
Under this interpretation, police officers who lacked fourth amendment probable 
cause to believe that they were confronted with the circumstances specified in 
Garner could act reasonably for the purpose of qualified immunity, according to 
the Court's decisions in Anderson and Malley. Scrutiny of the Garner decision 
and the Court's use of the term in Pierson v. Ray 273 reveals, however, that the 
Court probably meant the less stringent standard of objective reasonableness, 
even though "probable cause" is a term of art in constitutional law. 
In Garner both the majority and the dissent questioned whether the officer 
reasonably believed that the use of force was necessary.274 The majority stated 
that the police officer "could not reasonably have believed that [the decedent] 
268. See, e.g., Manin, 849 F.2d at 868-69 (in balancing nature and quality of intrusion against 
governmental interest, due regard must be given to need for officers to make split-second judgments 
regarding force needed for arrest). 
269. The similarity between the standard is apparent when one paraphrases the language from 
the Court's decision in Anderson: "The relevant question in this case ... is the objective (albeit fact-
specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the force used] to be lawful, in 
light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed." Anderson v. 
Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040 (1987). 
270. Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. I, 11-12 (1985) (emphasis supplied). 
271. See supra notes 154-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of Malley. 
272. See supra notes 178-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of Anderson. 
273. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See supra notes 52-56 and infra notes 278-81 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Pierson. 
274. Gamer, 471 U.S. at 21; id. at 25-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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posed any threat. "275 It later stated that the police officer "did not have prob-
able cause to believe that [the decedent] ... posed any physical danger to himself 
or others."276 The majority also referred to a report by the Commission on 
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies that prohibited the use of deadly 
force unless the police officer " 'reasonably believes that the action is in defense 
of human life.' " 277 The Garner Court seemed to find the terms "probable 
cause" and "reasonable belief" to be synonymous. 
In Pierson v. Ray,218 the Court also implicitly found the terms interchange-
able. 279 According to the Court, police officers have qualified immunity if they 
acted in good faith and had "probable cause" to make the arrests. 280 If the 
Court had meant "probable cause" as defined by the fourth amendment, then 
there would have been no need to assert qualified immunity as a defense because 
there would have been no fourth amendment violation. In using the term "prob-
able cause," the Court likely meant "reasonable belief."281 
Some circuit decisions support the view that the fourth amendment stan-
dard articulated in Garner mirrors the Harlow standard of objective reasonable-
ness. 282 In response to Garner, the Seventh Circuit has set forth the following 
fourth amendment standard: "a police officer's use of force in arresting a sus-
pect violates the [fourth amendment] if, judging from the totality of the circum-
stances at the time of the arrest, the officer used greater force than was 
reasonably necessary to make the arrest. " 283 The Fourth Circuit also has de-
scribed the standard as questioning whether "a reasonable officer" would have 
thought the force used was necessary.284 That court interpreted the fourth 
amendment standard as one of "objective reasonableness," requiring courts to 
275. Id. at 21. 
276. /d. 
277. /d. at 18 (quoting CoMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGEN· 
CIES, INC., STANDARDS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1-2 (1983)). 
278. 386 u.s. 547 (1967). 
279. Id. at 555-57. 
280. /d. 
281. See id. at 555 (police officers who unlawfully conducted arrests pursuant to unconstitu-
tional statute immune if they reasonably believed statute to be valid). 
282. See, e.g., Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1987) (fourth amend-
ment standard question, whether seizure was objectively reasonable); Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 
380, 384-88 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Phillips, J., dissenting) (fourth amendment standard when 
determining whether seizure was objectively reasonable), petition for cen. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3016 
(U.S. Feb. 2, 1988) (No. 87-1422); see also Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 201 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(upheld jury instruction stating that deadly force was permissible under the fourth amendment if 
officer "reasonably believed that the use of such force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily 
harm to himself"), vacated and opinion below rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(en bane); see generally Stevens v. Corbell, 832 F.2d 884, 890 (5th Cir. 1987) (concerning substantive 
due process claim, "The law is and was clear in allowing a police officer to use only the amount of 
force he honestly believes is needed."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2018 (1988). But see Young v. City of 
Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985) (determining whether officer acted in good faith and 
reasonably believed that force was necessary not the same as determining whether force was 
reasonable). 
283. Lester, 830 F.2d at 713. 
284. Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir. 1988). 
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determine the amou~t of force "objectively reasonable in light of the facts and 
circumstances."285 Similarly, other Fourth Circuit judges have approved of jury 
instructions questioning whether the force used was "reasonably necessary."286 
These judges approved of a jury instruction that paraphrased the Harlow stan-
dard for immunity. The instruction required the jury to consider whether "a 
reasonable and prudent officer would have applied [the same degree of force] in 
effecting the arrest under the circumstances disclosed in [the] case."287 
The Eleventh Circuit also has interpreted Garner's objective reasonableness 
test by specifying the following factors for courts to balance in determining 
whether the use of force was unreasonable: the scope of the intrusion, the place 
and manner in which it was conducted, and the officer's justification for using 
force.2SB 
Some circuit courts, however, have not elaborated on the fourth amend-
ment standard expressed in Garner, 289 and other courts have indirectly dis-
cussed the fourth amendment standard by finding that the Garner decision did 
not apply to the excessive force claim asserted. 290 Some courts }].ave held that 
the Garner standard is not applicable when officers were negligent; without ex-
planation, they have required a greater degree of culpability.291 One court erro-
285. Id. 
286. Justice, 834 F.2d at 386 (Phillips, J., dissenting, joined by Winter & Ervin, JJ.). The 
judges found that the following instruction stated the Gamer standard: 
The plaintiff ... claims that excessive force was used by (the] Defendant ... in connection 
with his arrest. A person, even if he is being lawfully arrested, has a constitutional right to 
be free of excessive force. An officer is entitled to use such force as a reasonable person 
would think is required to take one into custody, and this may include such physical force 
as is reasonably necessary to subdue a person who is struggling with an officer. However, 
an officer is not allowed to use any force beyond that reasonably necessary to accomplish 
his lawful purpose. Thus if you find Defendant used greater force than was reasonably 
necessary in the circumstances of this case, you find that the Defendant is liable for a 
violation of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights. 
Id. The jury instruction approved by these judges paraphrases the one proposed by Michael Avery 
and David Rudovsky, M. AVERY & D. RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LmGATION 
§ 13.3(d), at 13-7 (1987). 
287. 834 F.2d at 386 (Phillips, J., dissenting, joined by Winter & Ervin, JJ.). 
288. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (lith Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 
476 u.s. 1115 (1986). 
289. See Dugan v. Brooks, 818 F.2d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1987) (unreasonable force violates 
fourth amendment, which requires court to balance interests of parties); Griffin v. Hilke, 804 F.2d 
1052, 1056 (8th Cir. 1986) (deadly force to stop fleeing felon permissible if officer has "probable 
cause to believe that [felon] poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer 
or others"), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3184 (1987); see also Leber v. Smith, 773 F.2d 101, 105 (6th Cir. 
1985) (police officer who unintentionally shot and paralyzed suspect by falling while having gun 
cocked acted reasonably), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986). 
290. See, e.g., Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1987) (fourth amendment not 
implicated when officer negligently uses force), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 701 (1988); Brower v. lnyo 
County, 817 F.2d 540, 546-47 (9th Cir. 1987) (fourth amendment analysis requires court to balance 
interest of parties and to determine whether seizure was reasonable), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2869 
(1988). 
291. See, e.g., Dodd, 827 F.2d at 7 (reasonableness standard not applied in accidental shooting 
because otherwise it would result in fourth amendment violation based on negligence); Young v. City 
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neously determined that the fourth amendment was not implicated when officers 
used deadly force after placing handcuffs on a suspect. 292 Some courts have also 
erroneously determined that plaintiffs were not seized within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment when they were fatally injured after a highspeed auto 
chase293 or after hitting a roadblock that the driver allegedly did not see because 
police officers had blinded him with light as he approached the roadblock. 294 
Courts interpreting the Gamer decision have questioned whether the of-
ficers reasonably believed that the force used was necessary and have not focused 
attention on the Gamer Court's reference to "probable cause." The Gamer de-
cision and its progeny indicate the contours of the fourth amendment right-a 
seizure involving the use of deadly force is reasonable if the officers reasonably 
believed that the suspect threatened their safety or the safety of others, and a 
seizure involving the use of nondeadly force is reasonable if the officers reason-
ably believed that the degree of force used was necessary to maintain or effect an 
arrest. Thus, the standard for liability for a fourth amendment excessive force 
claim duplicates the standard for qualified immunity. 
Although the Gamer decision and the decisions by lower courts interpret-
ing it describe the contours of the fourth amendment, courts may disagree on the 
clarity of these contours for two reasons: fourth amendment excessive force 
claims require courts to balance the interests of the parties and each claim is 
fact-specific. 29s Although the judicial process of balancing often provides for an 
of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985) (negligence alone insufficient to constitute fourth 
amendment violation). 
292. Dodd, 827 F.2d at 7. Other courts and commentators have found that the fourth amend-
ment protects plaintiffs after they have been arrested. See, e.g., Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th 
Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Phillips, J., dissenting) (fourth amendment applicable to pretrial detainees), 
petitionforcert.fi/ed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3041 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1988) (No. 87-1422); Lester v. City of Chicago, 
830 F.2d 706, 713 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) (Gamer standard applicable to arrested person as long as in 
presence of arresting officers); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1384 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987) (fourth 
amendment preferred basis for examining claims arising from use of force during arrest or while 
attempting to maintain custody), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 752 (1988); Freyermuth, supra note 251, at 
701-05 (fourth amendment applicable to pretrial detainees); see generally Burch v. Apalachee Com-
munity Mental Health Serv., 840 F.2d 797, 807 (11th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (Clark, J., concurring) 
(fourth amendment applicable to mental patient detained in hospital). 
Courts have disagreed about whether the fourth amendment is the sole basis for recovery when 
plaintiffs are injured during an arrest. Compare Lester, 830 F.2d at 714 (fourth amendment is sole 
ground for claim alleging excessive force during arrest) with Jones v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 844 
F.2d 500, 504 (8th Cir. 1988) (substantive due process claim based on force during an arrest) and 
Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500-04 (lith Cir. 1985) (en bane) (both fourth amend-
ment and substantive due process grounds for unlawful force claims), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 
1124 (1986). 
293. See Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 202-04 (6th Cir. 1986) (restraint on plaintiff's ability 
to leave was not accomplished by police officer's show of authority, but was result of plaintiff's 
choice to disregard that authority, resulting in car accident). 
294. See Brower, 817 F.2d at 546-47 (plaintiff not seized because his freedom of movement was 
never restrained, and plaintiff's choice to avoid restraint is not seizure). But see Jamieson v. Shaw, 
772 F.2d 1205, 1209-11 (5th Cir. 1985) (roadblock causing injury to passenger constituted seizure). 
295. See, e.g., Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 775 (4th Cir. 1987). In Tarantino, the Fourth 
Circuit aptly described the problem of the fourth amendment: 
The meaning of the fourth amendment, at least when stated in broad philosophical terms, 
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unpredictable outcome, 296 the outcome for this particular fourth amendment 
claim is significantly more predictable297 than the outcome of a claim alleging 
that officers lacked probable cause, also a fact-specific claim. The outcome of an 
excessive force claim is more predictable because it simply requires a common 
sense determination that the conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances, 
a determination frequently made by the fact finder. The determination of 
whether officers had probable cause, on the other hand, requires consideration of 
whether the officers had sufficient reasons to believe that a crime was committed 
and that the defendant committed it. This latter determination notoriously has 
engendered vehement disputes among the courts. The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that "[t]here are so many variables in the probable-cause equation that 
one determination will seldom be a useful 'precedent' for another. "298 Recog-
nizing two standards of reasonableness makes more sense when courts fre-
quently cannot agree as to whether officers had probable cause. 299 
/d. 
In Pierson v. Ray,300 Mitchell v. Forsyth,301 Malley v. Briggs,302 and Ander-
is relatively clear. The precise action or combination of actions, however, which will in-
fringe a particular suspect's fourth amendment rights is often difficult for even the constitu-
tional scholar to discern because the legal doctrine has developed and continues to develop 
incrementally. 
296. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at 982 (balancing is "theory of interpretation cre-
ated to bring realism to law and to limit subjectivity in constitutional interpretation"; yet it "seems 
more and more manipulative"). 
297. The issue of liability generally depends on the fact finder's determination of the credibility 
of the parties-that is, whether the fact finder believes the plaintiff's or the officer's version of what 
happened. See, e.g., Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 921-22, 925-26 (1st Cir. 1987) Gury believed plain-
tiffs' version); Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1371 (8th Cir. 1985) (appellate court believed 
plaintiff's version and set aside summary judgment in favor of deputies). A jury trial is generally 
necessary to resolve factual disputes. See, e.g., Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 707-09 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (remand for new trial on excessive force claim; plaintiff's version of facts differed from 
that of officer's); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 923-24 (2d Cir. 1987) (where conflicting accounts of 
use of force given, summary judgment improper and resolution of conflicting accounts was for jury); 
Bibbo v. Mulhern, 621 F. Supp. 1018, 1021-24 (D.C. Mass. 1985) (evidence adduced by plaintiff 
could support a finding that constitutional rights were violated). 
298. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.ll (1983). 
299. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents ofthe Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 
1339, 1348-49 (2d Cir. 1972) (Lumbard, J., concurring) (probable cause is difficult legal issue to 
resolve). Judge Lumbard of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the lesser standard 
of reasonableness is the reasonable person standard of tort law and that this standard is appropriate 
when the court considers whether to impose liability upon officers for their lack of probable cause: 
This second and lesser standard is appropriate because, in many cases, federal officers can-
not be expected to predict what federal judges frequently have considerable difficulty in 
deciding and about which they frequently differ among themselves. It would be contrary 
to the public interest if federal officers were held to a probable cause standard as in many 
cases they would fail to act for fear of guessing wrong. 
/d. at 1349. This lesser standard of reasonableness is harmonious with the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion that police officers do not have a duty to predict the future of constitutional law. See supra text 
accompanying note 54. 
300. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
301. 472 U.S. 511 (1985). See supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text. 
302. 475 U.S. 335 (1986). See supra notes 154-77 and accompanying text. 
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son v. Creighton, 303 two standards of reasonableness were applied to other fourth 
amendment claims. In Anderson, the Court explicitly recognized two such stan-
dards, declaring that even if an official's conduct was unreasonable within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment, the conduct could be objectively reasonable 
for the purpose of qualified immunity.304 The Anderson Court determined that 
law enforcement officials could reasonably but mistakenly conclude that they 
had both probable cause and exigent circumstances supporting their warrantless 
search. 305 The Court focused on what the officer knew before deciding to act, 
stating the issue as "whether a reasonable officer could have believed Anderson's 
warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the infor-
mation the searching officers possessed. " 306 According to the Anderson Court, 
the issue was not only objective (would a reasonable officer have acted simi-
larly?), but also fact-specific (what did the officer know?). The Court's focus on 
the officer's reasonable belief is also consistent with its decisions addressing qual-
ified immunity for other fourth amendment claims. 307 
The lower courts have also interpreted the Harlow v. Fitzgerald 308 standard 
for qualified immunity as questioning whether the force used was objectively 
reasonable. 309 In discussing the objective reasonableness standard for qualified 
immunity, the Eleventh Circuit also noted that the qualified immunity standard 
does not question merely whether the force used was necessary, but also whether 
the officers reasonably believed that the force used was necessary.310 
Thus, the Harlow standard for qualified immunity and the fourth amend-
ment standard for excessive force claims overlap; both standards question 
whether the officer's belief that a certain amount of force was necessary is objec-
tively reasonable. 
b. Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Overlapping Standards 
Although the fourth amendment standard of liability and the qualified im-
303. 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987). See supra notes 178-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Anderson. 
304. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3041. 
305. /d. at 3039. 
306. /d. at 3040. 
307. See supra notes 52-56, 119-30, 154-77 and accompanying text for the Court's qualified 
immunity decisions in Pierson, Mitchell, and Malley. 
308. 457 u.s. 800 (1982). 
309. See, e.g., Whitt v. Smith, 832 F.2d 451, 452-54 (7th Cir. 1987) (must consider specific 
factual situation to determine whether officer reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable 
cause was present); White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986) (reasonableness of 
force analyzed in light of objective factors); Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543, 1548-50 (lith Cir. 
1985) (immunity where conduct does not violate rights of which reasonable person would have 
known); Bledscoe v. Garcia, 742 F.2d 1237, 1240 (lOth Cir. 1984) (force not privileged if in excess of 
what "actor reasonably believes to be necessary"); Bauer v. Norris, 713 F.2d 408, 411 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(whether defendant uses force that would appear necessary to reasonable person). 
310. See Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d 876, 881 (lith Cir. 1988). In Clark, the court stated "[T)he 
proper question is not whether in fact the escape could reasonably have been prevented in a less · 
violate manner; rather, the issue is whether a reasonable officer with the information available to [the 
officer] could have believed that less violent means were not reasonably available." /d. 
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munity standard overlap, determining whether qualified immunity is available as 
an affirmative defense to a charge of excessive force requires consideration of the 
substantive and procedural aspects of qualified immunity. In setting forth the 
Harlow standard, the Court has stressed the procedural aspects of the issue, em-
phasizing the courts should resolve the issue of qualified immunity before grant-
ing discovery. 311 Furthermore, it has determined that an order denying 
qualified immunity is an appealable interlocutory order because the question of 
immunity is collateral to the merits of the underlying claims.312 Although the 
Supreme Court has found the issue of qualified immunity to be collateral to the 
issue of liability for other fourth amendment claims, 313 courts should recognize 
that the issue of qualified immunity is not collateral to a fourth amendment ex-
cessive force claim. The issue of qualified immunity is identical, not collateral, 
to the issue of fourth amendment liability. Both raise the fact-specific question 
of whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the force used was nec-
essary under the circumstances. When material facts are not in dispute, motions 
for judgment on the pleadings314 and for summary judgment315 challenging the 
plaintiff's fourth amendment claim adequately protect officers because the 
fourth amendment standard of liability balances the state's interest in law en-
forcement against a plaintiff's interest in personal security.316 Therefore, a de-
fense of qualified immunity is superfluous. 
Courts, however, generally have distinguished the standard for fourth 
amendment liability from the standard for qualified. immunity, stating that reso-
lution of the qualified immunity issue is "conceptually distinct" from resolution 
of the underlying claim. 317 The qualified immunity standard is conceptually 
distinct in that it raises unique issues: it questions whether the general law 
clearly was established and whether the contours of the asserted right are suffi-
ciently clear to give officers notice that their conduct was unlawfut.3 18 A plural-
311. See, e.g., Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3039 n.2, where the Court stated that the "driving force 
behind Harlow's substantial reformation of qualified-immunity principles [was] that 'insubstantial 
claims' against government officials be resolved prior to discovery and on summary judgment if 
possible." I d. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's emphasis 
on avoiding unnecessary discovery. One court has stated that qualified immunity may be raised as a 
defense at any time because the defense is to shield officials from unnecessary costs and trials. Easter 
House v. Felder, 852 F.2d 901, 916 n.l6 (7th Cir.) (permitting dismissal of suit on summary judg-
ment at early stage of proceedings to protect public officials against burdens of unwarranted litiga-
tion), vacated pending rehearing en bane, 861 F.2d 494 (1988). 
312. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-30 (1985) (plurality opinion). See supra notes 119-
24 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mitchell. 
313. See supra notes 178-211 and accompanying text. 
314. See infra note 342 for a discussion of judgment on the pleadings. 
315. See infra note 343 for a discussion of summary judgment. 
316. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text. 
317. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527. See also Whitt v. Smith, 832 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527). But see generally Note, Lynch v. Cannatella: An Inconsistent 
Application of Qualified Immunity, 62 TuL. L. REv. 820, 824-27 (1988) (courts often confuse under-
lying claim with issue of qualified immunity). 
318. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524-30 (correctness of plaintiff's version of facts is immaterial; 
rather, court must determine whether legal norms allegedly violated by defendant were clearly estab-
lished or whether law clearly proscribed defendant's actions); see generally Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 
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ity of the Supreme Court reasoned that the resolution of whether the law was 
clearly established "does not entail a determination of the 'merits' of [a] plain-
tiff's claim that [a] defendant's actions were in fact unlawful."319 
Once courts recognize that the fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable 
seizures and that the contours of the fourth amendment indicate that officers 
reasonably must believe that the use of force was necessary, they should ac-
knowledge that, in resolving the qualified immunity issue, they are resolving the 
merits of the plaintiff's claim. The standards overlap completely and are not 
distinct because an officer has qualified immunity and complies with the fourth 
amendment if a reasonable officer would have believed that the officer's use of 
force was necessary. 320 
The standards have not overlapped in cases in which the Supreme Court 
has determined that qualified immunity is a defense for other fourth amendment 
claims. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 321 a plurality of the Court determined that quali-
fied immunity was available for an unconstitutional wiretap because at the time 
of the challenged action it was not clearly established that a warrantless wiretap 
conducted for the purpose of monitoring a domestic threat to national security 
was unconstitutional.322 In Pierson v. Ray 323 and Malley v. Briggs, 324 the Court 
distinguished between the fourth amendment standard and the standard for 
qualified immunity. It determined that qualified immunity was available for an 
unconstitutional arrest if officers had "probable cause" to arrest the plaintiff, a 
standard less stringent than the fourth amendment standard of probable 
cause. 325 In these cases, the less stringent standard of "probable cause" was met 
3039 (contours must be "sufficiently clear" to put officials on notice that conduct was unlawful). 
Some courts, for example, have stated that the fact finder should first determine whether an officer 
had probable cause and the court should then determine whether the law was clearly established. 
Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 1988) (judge made determination of immunity 
only after jury returned verdict on issue of probable cause). One court has erroneously stated that a 
court should determine whether law was clearly established and the fact finder should determine 
whether a reasonable official would have known that the conduct violated clearly established law. 
See Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1556 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3522 (U.S. Jan. 
30, 1989). Determining whether the law was clearly established is a task peculiarly suited for courts, 
not fact finders. 
319. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 529 n.lO. 
320. The Supreme Court's recognition of two standards of reasonableness for other fourth 
amendment claims has unfortunately been misconstrued by some courts: they often fail to delineate 
the fourth amendment standard because they address only the single issue of whether a reasonable 
officer could have believed the conduct to be lawful. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. 
Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988) (to determine whether conduct was unconstitutional 
under fourth amendment would be to render "advisory opinion"); Ostabutley v. Welch, 857 F.2d 
220, 224 (4th Cir. 1988) (inquiry limited to whether officer could reasonably believe that action was 
permissible under clearly established constitutional principles). Avoiding the issue of liability thus 
does little to clarify the scope of qualified immunity. 
321. 472 u.s. 511. 
322. /d. at 530-35. 
323. 386 u.s. 547 (1967). 
324. 475 u.s. "335 (1986). 
325. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-47; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555-57. See supra notes 154-77 and 
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if the officer's belief was reasonable. 326 Qualified immunity thus was available if 
the officer reasonably believed that probable cause was present, but the officer 
violated the fourth amendment if probable cause in fact was not present. The 
Court applied two standards of reasonableness in Anderson v. Creighton 327 not 
only to the issue of probable cause but also to the question of whether the officer 
reasonably believed that exigent circumstances were present. 328 The Anderson 
Court determined that the officer could have qualified immunity for a warrant-
less search if he reasonably believed that both probable cause and exigent cir-
cumstances were present. 329 The Court's adherence to two standards of 
reasonableness in all these cases did not compel it to resolve the merits of the 
underlying claim as it addressed whether qualified immunity was available. 
In contrast to these fourth amendment claims, a single standard of reasona-
bleness applies to excessive force claims asserted under the fourth amendment. 
Although a majority of the Supreme Court has not discussed whether qualified 
immunity is available when the qualified immunity standard overlaps with the 
substantive standard of liability, some judges have cogently argued that, when 
the standards overlap, qualified immunity is not a defense.330 In Anderson, Jus-
tice Stevens argued in his dissent that a court should not instruct the jury on 
immunity when the standards overlap. He contended that allowing officers to 
assert qualified immunity as a defense would be to give officers " 'two bites at the 
apple.' " 331 He maintained that the fourth amendment standard of liability pro-
tects the state's interest in law enforcement and that allowing officers to assert 
qualified immunity would compel courts to count the state's interest twice and a 
person's privacy interest only once. 332 In addition, he asserted that if a jury 
were to determine the availability of qualified immunity, it would be confused by 
accompanying text for a discussion of Malley; supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Pierson. 
326. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 345 (question is whether reasonably well-trained officer would 
have known that affidavit failed to establish probable cause); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557 (verdict for 
officers would follow if jury found that officers reasonably believed in good faith that arrest was 
constitutional). Professors Nahmod and Schwartz have similarly distinguished the qualified immu-
nity standard from the standard for liability for an erroneous arrest or search. See S. NAHMOD, 
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LmGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983, § 8.11, at 489 (2d 
ed. 1986) ("reasonable belief in the legal validity of an arrest and search was a different and less 
restrictive standard than probable cause"); M. SCHWARTZ & 1. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGA· 
TION: CLAIMS, DEFENSE, AND FEES§ 7.16, at 172-73 (1986). 
327. 107 s. Ct. 3034 (1987). 
328. /d. at 3038-39. 
329. /d. 
330. See, e.g., id., at 3049-54 (Stevens, 1., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.) 
(withdrawing qualified immunity as defense will encourage training of officers to distinguish between 
what officer considers reasonable and what Constitution deems reasonable); Newman, supra note 56 
at 461 (section 1983 actions suffer shortcomings, such as wrong defenses, wrong plaintiffs, wrong 
defendants, wrong burdens of proof, and wrong measures of damages). 
331. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3052 n.20 (Stevens,1., dissenting) (quoting Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 
F.2d 1560, 1569 (7th Cir. 1985) (en bane)). 
332. /d. at 3052 (Stevens,1., dissenting). Another judge, however, has argued that counting the 
state's interest twice is proper because the Harlow qualified immunity standard recognizes the need 
to give officials broad discretion for their "split-second judgments." Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 
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the overlapping standards. 333 
Some courts, however, have allowed officers two bites at the apple even 
when they recognize that the standards overlap. 334 They have reasoned that 
even though a jury generally determines whether the use of force was reasonable 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, a court should resolve the issue of 
reasonableness because the Supreme Court in Harlow "converted what were 
largely factual determinations into determinations of law."33S 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Anderson v. Creighton,336 however, does 
not indicate that the Harlow standard for qualified immunity raises only a legal 
question to be decided by the judge. 337 In Anderson, the Court discussed the 
procedural aspects of qualified immunity.338 The Court recognized the signifi-
cance of factual disputes in determining whether a court could resolve the issue 
of qualified immunity. 339 It noted that a court could, as a matter of law, deter-
mine whether an officer had qualified immunity if it had to consider only the 
plaintiff's allegations or only the defendant's allegations. 340 Immunity would be 
1560, 1576 (7th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (Coffey, J., concurring and dissenting) (determining availability 
of qualified immunity for mistaken judgments as to probable cause). 
333. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3053 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord Newman, supra note 56, 
at 460. 
334. See, e.g., Skevofilax v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 542 (D.N.J. 1984) (jury determines 
whether officer did in fact violate law only after court declares law to be firmly established); accord 
White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986) (question of reasonableness of force used 
in arrest usually for jury, but trial court must decide issue on summary judgment where qualified 
immunity at issue). 
335. Skevojilax, 586 F. Supp. at 542. Other courts have stated that once a determination is 
made that the law was clearly established, the fact finder should resolve the issue of qualified immu-
nity by determining whether the officer had a reasonable belief that the force used was necessary. 
See, e.g., Thorstead v. Kelley, 858 F.2d 571,575-76 (9th Cir. 1988) (question of whether reasonable 
officer could reasonably believe that conduct was legal is fact-specific and therefore appropriate for 
jury). The issue presented to the fact finder under these circumstances, however, is identical to the 
issue of liability under the fourth amendment. 
336. 107 s. Ct. 3034 (1987). 
337. Cf Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The Halperin court stated 
that the Harlow standard "did not ... alter the burden that Rule 56( c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure places on the movant to demonstrate, as a condition of summary judgment, that the 
objective inquiry raises 'no genuine issue as to any material fact.'" /d. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 
56( c)). 
338. 107 S. Ct. at 3042 n.6. The Court reiterated the procedural scheme first articulated in 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (plurality) (defendant pleading qualified immunity 
entitled to dismissal prior to discovery where plaintiff fails to allege violation of law or to summary 
judgment post-discovery where no genuine issue regarding occurrence of violation exists). The 
Court, however, did not detail the procedures for determining whether an official may assert the 
exceptional circumstances exception of Harlow. See supra notes 87, 92 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the exceptional circumstances exception and the necessary procedure for it utilization. 
This exception, however, may require resolution of factual disputes. See, e.g., Barnett v. Housing 
Auth. of Atlanta, 707 F.2d 1571, 1582-83 {lith Cir. 1983) (success of "extraordinary circum-
stances" claim dependent on defendant's proof of justifiable ignorance regarding relevant legal 
standard). 
339. 107 S. Ct. at 3042 n.6. 
340. /d In Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit erroneously inter-
preted the Court's decision in Harlow and amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as 
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proper if the actions alleged by the plaintiff were ones that "a reasonable officer 
could have believed to be lawful," and immunity would be improper if the ac-
tions alleged by the defendant were not ones that a reasonable officer could have 
believed to be lawful. 341 Resolving immunity by a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings342 or for summary judgment343 would be possible because no factual 
imposing upon plaintiffs a duty to clearly specify the facts forming the basis of their alleged constitu-
tional violations. See id. at 1477-82. Accord Freedman v. City of Allentown, 853 F.2d 1111, 1114-15 
(3d Cir. 1988) (complaint must specify harmful conduct causing plaintiff's injury). The Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Ctv. P. 11, compels an 
attorney to reasonably investigate the basis of a claim before filing it and that Rule 12(e), FED. R. 
Ctv. P. 12(e), allows federal judges to compel plaintiffs to submit a more definite statement. 751 
F.2d at 1481-82. The court, however, failed to refer to the Supreme Court decision in Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638-42 (1980), in which the Court discussed the elements of a claim under 
section 1983. In Gomez, the Court stated that because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, a 
plaintiff needs to allege only two elements--(1) a deprivation of a federal right, (2) by a person acting 
under color of state law. /d. at 640. 
341. Anderson, 101 S. Ct. at 3042 n.6. 
342. Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move for 
judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. FED. R. Ctv. P. 12(c). The pleadings 
include the complaint and the answer. FED. R. Ctv. P. 7(a). Because qualified immunity is an 
affirmative defense, officials seeking to assert qualified immunity as a defense must raise it in their 
answer. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); see also FED. R. Ctv. P. 8(c) (defendant must 
plead matter constituting affirmative defense). Failure to plead qualified immunity in an answer 
constitutes a waiver of the defense. See, e.g., Frett v. Government of Virgin Islands, 839 F.2d 968, 
973 n.l (3d Cir. 1988) (failure to plead affirmative defense results in involuntary waiver). Many 
courts have erroneously considered qualified immunity defenses in determining whether to grant an 
official's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which al-
lows courts to dismiss claims that fail to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. 
Ctv. P. 12(b)(6); see, e.g., Dominique v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1987) (defendant can 
challenge sufficiency of complaint under 12(b)(6) by asserting qualified immunity). These courts 
have not required officials to file an answer asserting qualified immunity as a defense. See, e.g., 
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1052 (9th Cir. 1988) (motion to dismiss for failure to 
state claim and motion for judgment on the pleadings are alternatives to asserting qualified immunity 
as defense); Dominique, 831 F.2d at 677 (prior to asserting qualified immunity defense, defendant 
can challenge sufficiency of complaint). Confusion as to the proper motion to assert in raising quali-
fied immunity as a defense probably occurred as result of the plurality's statement in Mitchell that 
"the denial of a defendant's motion for dismissal or summary judgment on the ground of qualified 
immunity" satisfies two of the requirements for finding an order appealable under the collateral 
orders doctrine. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). 
343. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is 
proper if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Ctv. P. 56( c). Recently the Supreme Court addressed the 
standards for granting summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-28 
(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-57 (1986). 
In Liberty Lobby, the Court discussed what is a "genuine" issue of fact. It stated that a genuine 
issue of fact exists when there is "sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury," but not 
when the "evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." /d. at 251-52. It 
noted that this standard is the same as the standard for determining whether to grant a directed 
verdict. /d. at 251. Accordingly, the Court held that in resolving a motion for summary judgment, a 
trial court must assume that the nonmoving party's evidence is true, draw all justifiable inferences in 
the nonmoving party's favor, and evaluate the evidence in light of the substantive standard of proof 
applicable at trial. /d. at 254-55. If the quantum of evidence is not sufficient to enable a reasonable 
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dispute would exist. Under these circumstances, the goal of the Harlow stan-
dard-to dismiss insubstantial suits prior to discovery-is attainable. 
The Anderson majority explained that discovery may sometimes be neces-
sary. 344 It noted that, if the plaintiff alleges actions that a reasonable officer 
would not have believed to be lawful and if the defendant alleges actions that a 
reasonable officer would have believed to be lawful, discovery is then appropriate 
prior to resolving the issue of immunity. 345 The Court explained that discovery 
under these circumstances should be "tailored" to the question of immunity.346 
In recognizing the need for discovery, the Anderson Court did not explain 
what a court should do when discovery fails to resolve what actions were taken 
by the officer.347 The Court did not specify the nature of the qualified immunity 
jury to find for the nonmoving party, then any issue of fact is not "genuine" and the court should 
grant the motion for summary judgment. /d. at 255. 
In Celotex, the Court addressed the procedural aspects of summary judgment. The Court 
stated that Rule 56 does not require a party moving for summary judgment to support its motion 
with affidavits. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 3223-24. The Court explained that when the nonmoving party 
has the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, the moving party may discharge its burden by 
demonstrating "that there is an absence of evidence [in the existing record) to support [an essential 
element ot] the nonmoving party's case." /d. After the moving party makes this initial showing, the 
burden shifts to the nonmoving party "to go beyond the pleadings" and designate " 'specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " /d. at 324 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56( e)). Under 
Liberty Lobby, the sufficiency of this showing is evaluated in light of the substantive standard of 
proof applicable at trial. 
The Court in Celotex noted that if the nonmoving party cannot make the requisite showing 
because of lack of discovery, the trial court is either to deny or continue the motion until discovery is 
completed. /d. at 326 (citing FED. R. C1v. P. 56(f)). This interpretation of Rule 56 is applicable 
when officials assert immunity. See, e.g., Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 188-89 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (Harlow standard did not alter procedures for moving for summary judgment). But see Elliott 
v. Perez, 751 F.2d at 1483 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (Harlow standard permits courts to dis-
miss claims even when discovery might have allowed plaintiffs to allege meritorious claims). 
For further discussion of the implications of Liberty Lobby and Ce/otex, see generally Childress, 
A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 6 REv. LmGA TION 263 
(1987) (new liberal standard for granting summary judgment turns process into mini-trial on paper); 
Note, Civil Procedure-Requirement of Affirmative Evidence by Party Moving for Summary Judge-
ment-Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 35 U. KAN. L. REv. 831 (1987) (use of summary judgment motion 
will diminish as result of Ce/otex decision); Comment, Federal Summary Judgment: The "New" 
Workhorse for an Overburdened Federal Court System, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 955 (1987) (examines 
Liberty Lobby and Ce/otex decisions and concludes procedural safeguards necessary to ensure ade-
quate discovery and notice at summary judgment level). 
344. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3042 n.6. The plurality in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 
(1985), first noted that discovery might be necessary prior to resolving the issue of qualified immu-
nity. /d. at 526. The plurality, however, inappropriately referred to the Harlow decision as support 
for this proposition. /d. The Mitchell plurality stated, "Harlow emphasizes that even such pretrial 
matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible, as 'inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disrup-
tive of effective government.' " /d. (emphasis supplied) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
817 (1982)). 
345. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3042 n.6. 
346. /d. 
347. /d. The Court tersely stated, "[D)iscovery may be necessary before Anderson's motion for 
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved." /d. The issue before the Court 
in Anderson, however, was whether the lower court "erred by refusing to consider [the officer's) 
argument that he was entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds if he could 
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defense-whether a judge or jury should determine whether the alleged actions 
were ones that a reasonable officer could have believed to be lawful. Even 
though the standard for qualified immunity overlaps with the standard for liabil-
ity under the fourth amendment, some courts have distinguished the standards 
by determining that the judge resolves the issue of qualified immunity. 348 Other 
courts have determined that the jury should resolve the issue. 349 Although a 
jury generally resolves factual disputes, the Court's emphasis in Harlow, Mitch-
ell, and Davis that the Harlow standard is "wholly objective" has clouded the 
recognition that the standard could also be fact-specific. 
The Harlow decision merely eliminated from the qualified immunity stan-
dard a single factual issue-whether the officers knew that they had acted un-
lawfully. It did not transform factual issues into legal questions.350 Justice 
establish as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have believed the search to be lawful." /d. 
at 3038 (emphasis supplied). 
348. See, e.g., White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1986) Gudge determines 
existence of probable cause); Schultz v. Thomas 649 F. Supp. 620, 622-23 (E. D. Wis. 1986) (where 
police acted with probable cause, qualified immunity issue not for jury), rev'd on other grounds, 832 
F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1987); Garcia v. Wyckoff, 615 F. Supp. 217, 223 (D.C. Colo. 1985) (qualified 
immunity is question of law because Gamer requires courts to balance interests of parties); Skevofi-
lax v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 542 (D.N.J. 1984) Gudge resolves qualified immunity issue). 
349. See, e.g., Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir. 1986) (question of good 
faith defense submitted to jury), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987); Vizbaras v. Prieber, 761 F.2d 
1013, 1016 (4th Cir. 1985) (use of excessive force by police a question for jury), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
l101 (1986); see generally Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1988) (" '[I]fthere are issues of 
disputed fact upon which the question of immunity turns . . . the case must proceed to trial.' ") 
(quoting Green v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 1987)); Schlegel v. Bebout, 841 F.2d 937, 945 
(9th Cir. 1988) ("existence of a reasonable belief that (the] conduct was lawful, viewed in light of 
clearly established law, is a question for the trier of fact"). See also Holt v. Artis, 843 F.2d 242, 247 
(6th Cir. 1988) (Wellford, J., dissenting) (unreasonableness of defendant's actions cannot be deter-
mined as matter of law); White, 797 F.2d at 816-17 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (where conflicting 
inferences of fact existed and trial court denied summary judgment on immunity issue, appellate 
court should not act as trier of fact to resolve.conflicting inferences in favor of police officers). 
350. Although the Harlow Court recognized that the factual issue of an official's subjective 
good faith often required extensive discovery and frequently precluded a court from granting an 
official's motion for summary judgment, Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-17, it did not implicitly approve of 
transforming factual questions into questions of law. Judge Schwarzer has noted, however, that for 
more than three hundred years judges have struggled to define what constitutes an issue of fact and 
what constitutes an issue of law. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment under the Federal Rules: Defining 
Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 469 (1984). According to Judge Schwarzer, an issue 
of fact questions whether "a thing was done or [whether] an event occurred." ld. at 470. An ulti-
mate fact is a mixed question of law and fact, one that is outcome determinative. /d. Judge 
Schwarzer has classified ultimate facts into three categories: those that should be decided by a jury, 
those that should be decided by a court, and those that may be decided by either a jury or a court. 
/d. at 472-74. In the first category, he stated that the following issues should be decided by a jury: 
"whether a person had reasonable cause, acted within a reasonable time or can be charged with 
notice.'' /d. at 4 72. These issues are similar to the issue presented when a plaintiff alleges that the 
use of force during an arrest violated the fourth amendmeni and when a police officer asserts quali-
fied immunity as a defense. See also Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1508 (11th Cir. 
1985) (en bane) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (fourth amendment standard 
of liability presents mixed question of fact and law; it questions what facts were available to officer, a 
factual determination, and it questions the reasonableness of officer's response, a legal determina-
tion), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 1124 (1986). Judge Schwarzer maintained that a jury should 
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Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Anderson, properly questioned in a 
decision rendered prior to his joining the Court whether "the expansive language 
of [the Harlow, Mitchell, and Davis decisions] is to be taken seriously."351 He 
emphasized that although the Court described its standard as "objective," the 
Harlow standard did not alter the procedures for moving for summary judg-
ment. 352 He declared that after Harlow an official moving for summary judg-
ment on the ground of qualified immunity still had the burden of demonstrating 
"that the objective inquiry raise[d] 'no genuine issue as to any material fact.' " 353 
Justice Scalia inferred from Harlow and its progeny that the issue of quali-
fied immunity could sometimes be resolved prior to discovery and that some-
times it could not. 354 The Court's decisions in Harlow, Mitchell, and Davis 
emphasized that the qualified immunity issue could be resolved prior to discov-
ery. As Justice Stevens soundly noted in his Anderson dissent, the Harlow Court 
simply "assumed that many immunity issues could be determined as a matter of 
law before the parties had exchanged depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions. "355 The issue of immunity could be resolved under these cir-
cumstances when the law was not clearly established and when a court ex-
amined only the plaintiff's or only the defendant's allegations, as discussed 
above. 356 Such issues could be decided as a matter of law and qualified immu-
nity could be immunity from suit, not a mere defense to liability. 
Nevertheless, when factual issues are intertwined with resolution of the im-
munity question, then discovery may be necessary and qualified immunity may 
only be a defense to liability, not an immunity from suit. 357 Under these cir-
decide these issues because such issues generally require ad hoc decision making and such decisions 
turn on an "assessment of human behavior [that is] within the common experience of jurors." 
Schwarzer, supra, at 472. 
351. Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
352. /d. at 188-89. 
353. /d. at 189 (quoting FED. R. Ctv. P. 56(c)). In Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558 (lith Cir. 
1988), the Eleventh Circuit detailed the procedures associated with a motion for qualified immunity. 
/d. at 1563-65. The court stated that officials must first prove that the challenged act required them 
to exercise discretion. /d. at 1563-64. The burden then shifts to the plaintilf to establish that the 
actions violated clearly established law. /d. at 1564. If the law was clearly established and there is 
"a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the [official] actually engaged in conduct that violated 
clearly-established law," then the plaintilf is entitled to discovery. /d. at 1563. If discovery reveals 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, then summary judgment is proper. /d. If a genuine 
issue of material fact exists, summary judgment is improper. /d. at 1564-65. If the law was not 
clearly established, then the official is entitled to summary judgment, even if factual disputes exist. 
/d. 
354. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3042 n.6 (1987) (if officer's alleged actions are 
such as reasonable officer could believe lawful, no discovery necessary; if alleged actions are not such 
as reasonable officer could believe lawful, and officer's version differs from plaintift's, discovery may 
be necessary). 
355. /d. at 3045 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
356. See supra notes 338-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the procedures associ-
ated with the qualified immunity defense. 
357. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3045 & n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice 
Stevens argued that when factual issues are present, the Harlow standard for qualified immunity 
does not apply because it was designed to afford immunity from suit. /d. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In 
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cumstances, qualified immunity is a defense to be decided at trial because of the 
Anderson Court's expansive definition of what constitutes "clearly established 
law." By defining it to encompass the clarity of the "contours" of the asserted 
right, the Court allowed resolution of the qualified immunity issue to be fact-
specific. The Anderson Court could have promoted its asserted "wholly objec-
tive" standard by only questioning whether the law was clearly established that 
the officer needed probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify a warrant-
less search of a third-party home. The Court instead expanded the scope of 
qualified immunity and allowed factual inquiries by also questioning whether the 
particular actions taken by the officer were within the contours of the fourth 
amendment. 
The fact-specific nature of the qualified immunity issue is also apparent in 
excessive force claims based on the fourth amendment. In contrast to the fourth 
amendment claims discussed by the Court in its analysis of the Harlow standard 
for qualified immunity, this fourth amendment claim raises the same issue as 
that presented by the Harlow standard: would a reasonable officer have believed 
that the force was necessary? When a jury determines the facts underlying an 
excessive force claim, it also resolves the issue of qualified immunity. The stan-
dards for liability and immunity overlap. Qualified immunity is thus an unnec-
essary defense when material factual disputes are present. 
CONCLUSION 
When alleging that officers used excessive force during an arrest, plaintiffs 
have asserted violations of both the fourteenth amendment, which prohibits con-
duct that shocks the conscience, and the fourth amendment, which prohibits 
unreasonable conduct. Courts have agreed that officers who violate the four-
teenth amendment may not assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, 
which shields officers from liability if their conduct was objectively reasonable. 
Courts have disagreed, however, as to whether officers who use unreasonable 
force during an arrest may properly assert the defense of qualified immunity. 
The disagreement has arisen because the Supreme Court has adopted two stan-
dards of reasonableness for fourth amendment claims. It has stated that con-
duct "unreasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment may 
nevertheless be "objectively reasonable" for the purpose of qualified 
the alternative, he soundly argued that even if immunity were available when there is a factual 
dispute, a jury should resolve the factual disputes and the issue of immunity. /d. at 3047 & n.lO 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Some courts have properly recognized that the jury should determine factual disputes, espe-
cially when liability for an excessive force claim depends on determining the credibility of the wit-
nesses. See, e.g., Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 925 (1st Cir. 1987) (dicta) (in some circumstances, 
reasonable courts could disagree whether force used was excessive, and qualified immunity issue for 
jury). Some courts, however, have erroneously made their own factual findings. See generally Her-
ren v. Bowyer, 850 F.2d 1543, 1544-47 (11th Cir. 1988) (summary judgment granted on excessive 
force claim even though material facts disputed); Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 700-01 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (official's motion for dismissal for failure to state claim granted because court did not find 
plaintiff's allegations "believable"). 
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immunity. 3s8 
The history of the qualified immunity defense indicates the Court's interest 
in protecting officials from frivolous civil rights suits. The Court first articulated 
a standard that denied immunity if officials had acted maliciously or if they had 
violated clearly established constitutional or statutory rights. 3S9 It later elimi-
nated subjective good faith as a factor in its attempt to articulate a qualified 
immunity standard that would be "wholly objective," one that would allow 
courts to dispose of insubstantial suits prior to discovery.360 The Court recog-
nized that the issue of qualified immunity could be resolved as a matter of law in 
three situations: (1) if the law pertaining to the plaintiff's claims was not clearly 
established, then the officer had immunity; (2) if the facts as alleged by the plain-
tiff indicated that a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct to be 
lawful, then the officer had qualified immunity; and (3) if the facts as alleged by 
the defendant indicated that a reasonable officer could not have believed the 
conduct to be lawful, then the officer did not have immunity.361 
Recently, however, the Court has expanded the scope of immunity by rec-
ognizing that the standard for qualified immunity was also fact-specific. Ac-
cording to the Court, officials have qualified immunity even if the general 
principle of law relied on by the plaintiff was clearly established. 362 Officials 
have qualified immunity, the Court reasoned, if the "contours" of the asserted 
right were not sufficiently clear to give officials notice that their conduct was 
unlawful. 363 The Court recognized that under some circumstances discovery 
would be necessary before the immunity issue could be resolved. 364 
In applying the current standard for qualified immunity to excessive force 
claims alleging a violation of the fourth amendment, courts should recognize 
that qualified immunity is an unnecessary defense because the standard for qual-
ified immunity is identical to the fourth amendment standard for liability. Both 
the general principle of law and the contours of the fourth amendment right to 
be free from excessive force are established; the fourth amendment prohibits 
unreasonable force, and it questions whether a reasonable officer would have 
believed that the force used was necessary. Courts may simultaneously deter-
358. See Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3041 (1987) (qualified immunity extends to 
officers who allegedly violated fourth amendment); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986) (Leon 
standard of objective reasonableness defines qualified immunity protecting officer accused of uncon-
stitutional arrest); see also supra notes 154-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two 
standards of reasonableness. 
359. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (official's deprivation of constitutional 
rights of another with malicious intent defeats qualified immunity); see also supra notes 42-143 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's evolving standards for immunity. 
360. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-20 (substantial cost in form of money and manpower prohib-
its inquiry into subjective good faith); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (objective 
reasonableness of official's conduct only relevant inquiry impacting application of qualified 
immunity). 
361. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1984) (plurality). 
362. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038-39 (1987). 
363. Id. at 3039. 
364. Id. at 3042 n.6. 
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mine the issue of immunity and liability by a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings or for summary judgment when the facts as alleged by the plaintiff indicate 
that a reasonable officer would have believed that the use of force was necessary 
or if the facts as alleged by the defendant indicate that a reasonable officer would 
not have believed that the use of force was necessary. When the facts alleged by 
the parties conflict-that is, when the facts alleged by the plaintiff indicate that a 
reasonable officer would not have believed that the force was necessary-then 
material facts are in dispute and discovery is necessary. Courts should recognize 
that when the fact finder determines the issue of liability under the fourth 
amendment, it automatically determines the issue of qualified immunity. 
In this unique fourth amendment context, qualified immunity therefore is 
an unnecessary defense. Although the Supreme Court has permitted a qualified 
immunity defense for other fourth amendment violations, in those decisions the 
standard for liability did not duplicate the standard for qualified immunity. 365 
Because of the potential for confusion, a jury should not be instructed on the 
issue of qualified immunity when the plaintiff alleges that the use of force vio-
lated the fourth amendment. The standard for liability in this situation fully 
protects the balance of interests represented by the standard for qualified 
immunity. 
365. See Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040 (1987) (principles of qualified immunity 
pennit defendant's summary judgment argument that warrantless search of home was reasonable); 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986) (qualified immunity does not apply to officer who is 
issued arrest warrant based on application that reasonably well-trained officer would know failed to 
establish probable cause). 
